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ARTICLES 
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE NECESSITIES OF 
WAR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
John C. Dehn* 
While the current Administration has largely abandoned claims of plenary 
presidential authority to fight the nation’s wars, courts, scholars, and policy makers 
continue to debate the nature and scope of the powers conferred by the September 18, 
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. This Article examines primarily Supreme 
Court precedent to distill the general scope and limits of the President’s powers to 
fight the nation’s international and non-international armed conflicts. It concludes that 
the Supreme Court has expressly endorsed and consistently observed (although 
inconsistently applied) two concepts of necessity attributable to the Commander-in-
Chief power. The first is military necessity: the power to employ all military measures 
not prohibited by applicable law and reasonably calculated to defeat a national enemy. 
The case law is reasonably clear that “applicable law” in this context includes all 
domestic and international law specifically applicable to armed conflict. Military 
necessity also encompasses a second type of necessity: public necessity. Analogous to 
the common law tort doctrine, precedent reveals that, in armed conflict, public 
necessity permits the abrogation of private, statutory, and even certain constitutional 
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rights under sufficiently exigent circumstances. A third necessity related to war has 
been theorized but never clearly addressed by the courts: an alleged presidential 
power to take all actions necessary to counter an imminent threat to the nation’s 
existence. This is best understood as an extreme form of public necessity, here termed 
“governmental necessity.” This Article distills and relates these three forms of 
necessity, explaining how they inform and complicate questions regarding the 
President’s powers to conduct war. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over a decade after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the courts appear to be only 
marginally closer to understanding the precise scope and limits of the authority granted 
to the President by Congress under the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF). The AUMF empowers the President to 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.1 
The courts have rejected, and a new Administration has abandoned (to an 
increasingly uncertain extent), claims that the President has complete discretion to fight 
the nation’s armed conflicts in any manner the President deems expedient. Public and 
scholarly debates about the President’s war powers have centered on: the authority to 
use “enhanced interrogation techniques” in apparent violation of both international and 
domestic law;2 the authority to indefinitely detain a putative enemy fighter (or 
“belligerent” or “combatant”);3 the power to conduct drone attacks beyond 
 
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
2. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE (2011); available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2011/07/12/getting-away-torture (detailing alleged violations by Bush 
Administration officials of international and domestic laws proscribing torture); José E. Alvarez, Torturing the 
Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 179–98 (2006) (summarizing ways Bush Administration “twisted” 
international law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 
1233 (2005) (arguing Bush Administration ignored international laws banning “coercive, cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading” interrogation techniques); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate 
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 
824–38 (2005) (detailing Bush Administration violations of Geneva Convention and human rights law); Eric 
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 671, 675 (2006) 
(proposing legalization of coercive interrogation techniques, subject to numerous restrictions); Maj. 
Christopher B. Shaw, The International Proscription Against Torture and the United States’ Categorical and 
Qualified Responses, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 289 (2009) (arguing that, due to legal and policy 
failures, Bush administration engaged in torture in violation of domestic and international law due to 
leadership and policy failures). 
3. Judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia have rendered several decisions on this 
topic, but have yet to address the detention of civilian security threats. For a discussion of these cases, see 
BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0: THE GUANTANAMO 
HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2011), available at http://www.brrokings.edu/papers/ 2011/05_guantanamo_ 
wittes.aspx; see also Laura M. Olson, Guantanamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District Court’s Decisions 
Consistent with IHL Internment Standards?, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 197, 242 (2009) (“In their analogous 
application of [International Humanitarian Law], both the Administrations and the court analogize solely to the 
Third Geneva Convention [addressing prisoners of war]. No mention is made of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention [addressing civilians and civilian security threats].”). Failing to consider civilian security-threat 
detention creates incentives to adopt overbroad or vague standards for who may be detained as a combatant 
consistent with the laws of war. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and 
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2094 (2005) (arguing AUMF impliedly authorizes all 
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Afghanistan’s borders;4 and the use of, and alternatives to, military commissions.5 As 
the opinions attending the D.C. Circuit decision in Al-Bihani v. Obama6 make clear, all 
of these topics raise related questions regarding the extent to which relevant 
international law informs the substance or limits the scope of the presidential 
authority.7 
Before September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), debates focused primarily on a President’s 
ability to initiate war or military action rather than the lawfulness of measures adopted 
to conduct it.8 This is likely because most post-Vietnam conflicts have been small, 
limited conflicts or military contingency operations. They presented little perceived 
direct threat to the nation and garnered little national attention regarding the specifics 
of how they were conducted. Moreover, technology did not allow the public or the 
 
detentions permitted by international laws governing armed conflict without clarifying detention authorized); 
Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention 
Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1082–87 (2008) (discussing various detention models and their weaknesses in 
face of terrorist threats). But see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the 
Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2659–61 (2005) (discussing international humanitarian 
law requirements for internment of civilians as security threats). 
4. See Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 656–62 (2009) (arguing that unmanned aerial attacks of proper targets in 
Pakistan are lawful); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 
2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (forthcoming), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (arguing that unmanned aerial strikes at targets in Pakistan are 
unlawful); Kenneth Anderson, Predators Over Pakistan, WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 8, 2010, at 26 (arguing 
that unmanned aerial attacks are both legal and effective); see also Maj. Michael D. Banks, Addressing State 
(Ir-)Responsibility: The Use of Military Force as Self-Defense in International Counter-Terrorism Operations, 
200 MIL. L. REV. 54, 65–67 (2009) (arguing that, under certain conditions, a state may use military force 
against a non-state terrorist organization if host state within which organization is located or operating is 
unwilling or unable to stop it from committing terrorist attacks). 
5. See David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating 
Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 121 (2006) (arguing certain provisions of international 
law governing armed conflict should govern military commissions); Scott L. Silliman, Prosecuting Alleged 
Terrorists by Military Commission: A Prudent Option, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 289, 292–97 (2009) 
(arguing military commissions are a legally viable and sound policy option for trying suspected terrorists when 
used in combination with federal district courts); Steven Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit 
on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295, 298–300 (2010) (arguing that international 
humanitarian law provides narrow exception to constitutional assignment of power to adjudicate and punish 
crimes, and thereby serves as constitutional limit on executive power to try offenses and offenders by military 
commission). See generally LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005) (recounting and critiquing evolution and use of military 
commissions/tribunals, primarily from a separation of powers perspective); GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009) (proposing new 
court system to deal with terrorism). 
6. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
7. See generally id. In the denial of rehearing, D.C. Circuit judges expressed different theories about 
whether or how international law is relevant to the President’s ability to preventively detain suspected enemy 
belligerents or fighters. See Al-Bihiani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
8. Members of both houses of Congress attempted to prevent the President from unilaterally committing 
U.S. forces to military action with regard to the first war with Iraq, Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 
(D.D.C. 1990), and the 1999 Kosovo military intervention, Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). The books and articles on this topic are too numerous to include here. See infra note 16 for citations to 
some of the many sources that have addressed the matter. 
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President immediate and direct access to on-going details of military operations or 
other government actions, particularly those in distant lands. A U.S. President was 
simply not perceived as a key factor in the day-to-day conduct of troops in battle or 
other federal agents in the field. 
Modern technologies have radically altered this dynamic. The internet and other 
technologies have substantially increased government access to public and private 
information. News organizations provide constant war coverage and commentary from 
around the globe. Military decisions once made by senior commanders in austere 
locations are now made by the President or Secretary of Defense.9 Through modern 
technology, both elected branches—but particularly the executive—may now monitor 
and influence military and other actions in real time, exercising unprecedented control 
over the details of ongoing hostilities.10 As the President’s direct involvement in the 
details of war fighting increases, a more complete understanding of the distribution of 
national war powers is needed. This need was amply demonstrated by the Bush 
Administration’s approach to legal issues surrounding the “post-9/11 conflict.”11 
A sense of enhanced presidential control must not cause us to forget the 
complexity of modern conflicts and battlefields.12 The President and his subordinates 
necessarily require broad discretion to determine precisely how to fight and defeat an 
elusive and adaptive enemy in order to win our nation’s armed conflicts and preserve 
our national security.13 Express congressional authorization for or regulation of every 
aspect of military operations is neither practical nor desirable. The challenge is to 
understand and articulate the breadth of permissible executive discretion without 
minimizing the import of the law limiting it. 
 
9. Again, there are numerous examples. For a particularly interesting account of civilian leaders 
exercising almost complete control over target selection during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 1999 
military campaign in Kosovo, see WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR 162–344 (2002), and DAVID 
HALBERSTAM, WAR IN A TIME OF PEACE: BUSH, CLINTON AND THE GENERALS 426–80 (2001). 
10. For example, counterterrorism advisor John Brennan confirmed that President Obama watched in 
“real time” the operation against bin Laden, in which bin Laden was killed by the U.S. military. Press Briefing 
by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism 
John Brennan (May 2, 2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/press-
briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-and-assistant-president-homela; see also HALBERSTAM, supra note 9, at 
457–60 (showing how modern technological warfare and political stakeholders influenced military actions in 
Kosovo). 
11.  “Post-9/11 conflict” refers to military actions involving armed hostilities undertaken by the United 
States against al Qaeda and so-called “associated” forces around the globe, as well as to the conflict with al 
Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. Regarding the Bush Administration’s legal approach, see generally THE 
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter 
TORTURE PAPERS]. 
12. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY B-1 (2006) (“Soldiers and Marines spend a lot 
of time in suburban and urban areas interacting with the populace. This battlefield is three dimensional. 
Multistory buildings and underground lines of communications, such as tunnels and sewers, can be very 
important. Insurgents also use complex natural terrain to their advantage as well.”). 
13. For an example of the difficulty in distinguishing between irregular enemy fighters and civilians, see, 
Dexter Filkins, Loyalties of 4 Killed in Afghan Raid Remain Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A4. For an 
example of the adaptive nature of non-state actor enemies, see Alissa J. Rubin, Taliban Using Lighter Touch to 
Win Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A1. 
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This Article examines the general nature and scope of the President’s powers to 
conduct the nation’s international and non-international armed conflicts.14 It first 
examines evidence of the original understanding of the elected branches regarding their 
relative authority over the armed forces. It then closely analyzes key Supreme Court 
precedent to identify common threads in the understanding of the Commander-in-Chief 
power as well as the separation of powers over the nation’s war fighting. It builds on 
the scholarship of Professors Barron and Lederman regarding the nature of the 
Commander-in-Chief power,15 but is more narrowly focused on the powers to conduct 
war or armed conflicts through the selection of appropriate means and methods for 
fighting them.16 It also draws upon Professor Monaghan’s analysis of emergency 
presidential powers.17 
This analysis reveals that a President’s powers to conduct war in both 
international and non-international armed conflict are based in two concepts of 
necessity fully supported by precedent, and possibly a third that is sometimes discussed 
but is neither supported nor fairly addressed by the case law.18 The first is best 
described as a doctrine of implied powers that has at times been referred to as “military 
 
14. As used herein, “armed conflict” refers to all armed violence between the United States and other 
nations, as well as to any armed violence between the United States and non-state actors with sufficient 
magnitude to trigger application of the laws of war. Commentators generally agree that noninternational armed 
conflict exists when hostilities reach a minimum level of intensity between parties of sufficient organization. 
See, e.g., James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian 
Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313, 318 (2003) (citing 
international tribunals for the proposition that noninternational armed conflict exists when there is “protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such armed groups” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The intensity inquiry examines “the number, duration and intensity of 
individual confrontations, the type of weapons and other military equipment used, the number and calibre of 
munitions fired, the number of persons and types of forces partaking in the fighting, the number of casualties, 
the extent of material destruction” among other factors. Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 
3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1, 4 (2011). 
15. Their work appears in two issues of the Harvard Law Review. David J. Barron & Martin S. 
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman I]; David J. Barron & Martin 
S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 
(2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman II]. 
16. This Article will not examine claims of general presidential authority to set foreign policy not 
involving the use of force that might be implemented through the military, or to initiate armed conflict without 
congressional authorization. For a range of opinions and analysis on the latter topic, see generally, LOUIS 
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 
B.U. L. REV. 19 (1970). 
17. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993). This 
Article will not undertake an analysis of the executive’s emergency powers to protect United States 
instrumentalities, citizens and their property domestically or abroad as discussed in Professor Monaghan’s 
work, and at length in Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186). Such inquiry would 
require an analysis of the power to initiate military or other defensive actions rather than the means by which 
to conduct them. 
18. The basis for the claim of substantially equal war powers in both international and non-international 
armed conflict will become apparent. This Article draws upon Supreme Court precedent from both types of 
conflicts in which it is clear that the Court has not distinguished between them in interpreting the general 
nature and scope of the powers possessed by the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates in armed conflict. 
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necessity.” Military necessity is the power to employ all military measures that are not 
prohibited by applicable law and are reasonably calculated to defeat a national enemy. 
Precedent is reasonably clear that the law applicable to a given aspect of armed conflict 
may be domestic, international, or (most often) the relevant aspects of both.19 
The concept of military necessity also encompasses powers analogous to the 
common law tort doctrine of public necessity. The tort doctrine supports the power to 
invade private property rights when strictly necessary to avert an imminent public 
harm.20 As will be shown, the concept of public necessity related to war permits the 
abrogation of some private, statutory, and even constitutional rights in exigent 
circumstances.21 In both war and tort, however, such necessity is limited to discrete 
exigent circumstances and does not permit the abrogation of any law clearly intended 
to govern the exigency at issue. 
The third concept of necessity related to war is best understood as an extreme 
form of public necessity, here termed “governmental necessity.” Governmental 
necessity is theorized as a general power to counter a threat to the nation’s existence 
without legal constraint. It therefore includes the power to temporarily violate domestic 
and international laws, including those specifically applicable to armed conflict or other 
exigencies when justified by the dire nature of a threat, but only so long as Congress is 
informed of and ratifies the actions of the executive.22 The mere existence of such a 
power under the Constitution is subject to serious doubt. It also appears to be legally 
unmanageable, with an uncertain relationship to concepts of congressional ratification 
or indemnification. 
Interrelated and sometimes overlapping in practice and political discourse, these 
“necessities of war” naturally lead to confusion regarding the scope of the executive 
branch’s ability to act either in the absence of or contrary to domestic or international 
law. Although the Supreme Court has been neither perfectly clear nor entirely 
 
19. This Article will not undertake a complete analysis of what constitutes domestic or international law 
specifically applicable in armed conflict. It discusses the sources of specific rules of decision supporting 
Supreme Court decisions. A thorough review of the topic requires a separate analysis, particularly regarding 
international law. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, with Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3 
(disagreeing over role and import of relevant international humanitarian law to military actions authorized by 
AUMF). 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965). There does not appear to be an analogous doctrine 
in current drafts for the Third restatement. 
21. Note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
A privilege similar to that stated in this Section has been recognized in older cases, where members 
of the military forces have acted to occupy, remove, or destroy property for the purpose of 
protection against a public enemy. Such action, in the exercise of special military power or authority 
in time of war or of martial law, lies beyond the scope of the ordinary law of Torts, and is therefore 
beyond the scope of this Restatement. 
Id. § 196 cmt. i; see, e.g., Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 362–63 (Pa. 1788) (finding 
Continental Congress had authority to remove and store barrels of flour to prevent their capture by enemy 
forces and was not required to provide compensation when those barrels were later captured). 
22. Some refer to this as a president acting “extralegally.” JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: 
LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 80 (2007). Others use the term 
“extraconstitutional[].” Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 746. I will not here undertake to compare, 
contrast, or define these two terms. 
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consistent in its approach and analysis, these concepts of necessity are readily 
discernable and in some cases explicitly endorsed in the Court’s opinions.23 
The need for caution is clear. It is undoubtedly true that the President must have 
flexibility to meet complex threats to the nation’s security and the near infinite 
variables of the modern battlefield. However, claims of plenary executive power to 
fight a preventive war against an enemy whose identification might be somewhat 
statutorily vested to the President’s discretion24 amplify war’s historic dangers to the 
rule of law. 
These dangers are particularly acute when the exercise of executive discretion is 
based on information not available to the general public. Under such circumstances, 
claims of plenary Commander-in-Chief power become more than a “persuasive 
dialectical weapon in political controversy.”25 They sustain an ability to act in complete 
secrecy on a broad range of matters, thereby avoiding political discourse that might 
lead to controversy until a given issue is a fait accompli. The debate regarding 
enhanced interrogation techniques, for example, did not become widely public until 
after the revelation of abuses at Abu Ghraib in April of 2004.26 The existence of so-
called “black sites” where government agents used “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” was not officially acknowledged until over two years later.27 Although 
there have been multiple uncoordinated investigations of detainee abuse, Congress 
appears to have effectively excused many government agents from prosecution in 
domestic courts before all of the facts were known.28 
 
23. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the Court’s treatment of military necessity. 
24. Recall that the AUMF provided the President with the authority to “use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.” AUMF, 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224–25 (2001) (emphasis added).  Compare Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 
727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47 (2010) (holding “merits of the President’s (alleged) decision to launch an attack on a 
foreign target” is political question inappropriate for judicial review), with John C. Dehn, A Proposal for 
Judicial Review of War Measures, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 176 (2011), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=40 (arguing in favor of deferential judicial review of 
executive targeting decisions in armed conflict). 
25. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 647 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
26. See Paust, supra note 2, at 838–51 (discussing critical reports and media attention concerning 
interrogation techniques authorized by Bush Administration). 
27. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Michael Fletcher, Bush Says Detainees Will Be Tried; He Confirms Existence 
of CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1 (reporting on Bush’s confirmation of secret detention sites 
and irregular interrogation methods for various terrorist suspects.) 
28. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 contained the following provision: 
In any civil action or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, member of the Armed 
Forces, or other agent of the United States Government who is a United States person, arising out of 
the officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent’s engaging in specific 
operational practices, that involve detention and interrogation of aliens who the President or his 
designees have determined are believed to be engaged in or associated with international terrorist 
activity that poses a serious, continuing threat to the United States, its interests, or its allies, and that 
were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that they were conducted, it shall 
be a defense that such officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know 
that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know 
the practices were unlawful. Good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an important factor, 
among others, to consider in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and understanding would 
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the nature and relative 
powers of the elected branches over the national armed forces. It questions the 
appropriateness of applying a core/periphery executive-powers analysis, one based in 
part on Justice Jackson’s analytical framework in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,29 to the Commander-in-Chief power.30 Part III analyzes early judicial 
understandings of the nature and relative scope of the Commander-in-Chief and 
congressional powers over the nation’s wars, including their objects, scope, and means. 
Part IV distills Supreme Court precedent to reveal the coalescence of the concept of 
military necessity, including its public necessity component. Although military 
necessity may have been first explicitly articulated in Dr. Francis Lieber’s account of 
the laws governing armed conflict,31 it appears to accurately describe the Supreme 
Court’s long-held view of the breadth and limits of the Commander-in-Chief power 
and was expressly adopted as a legal term of art in at least one opinion.32 Part V 
explores the idea that the President possesses some form of extraordinary emergency or 
public necessity power justifying the violation of even law specifically applicable to an 
armed conflict or other exigency. It addresses the probable nature and scope of any 
such power and how it relates to and differs from the doctrines of military and public 
necessity—as well as its uncertain relationship with the concept of congressional 
indemnification and ratification. 
Though the debate ebbs and flows, the opposite ends of the spectrum are clear. At 
one end is the advice of Bush Administration lawyers who conceived of the 
Commander-in-Chief power as one of inherent, plenary powers.33 In large part due to 
this error, these lawyers interpreted the scope of military necessity to be nearly (if not 
completely) co-extensive with that of governmental necessity, permitting the violation 
 
have known the practices to be unlawful. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
extinguish any defense or protection otherwise available to any person or entity from suit, civil or 
criminal liability, or damages, or to provide immunity from prosecution for any criminal offense by 
the proper authorities. 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §1404(a), 119 Stat. 3136, 3475–76 (codified in relevant 
portion at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)). 
29. 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
30. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 720–50 (proposing conceptual framework for 
analyzing Youngstown-type cases); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 2050–51 (describing how Jackson’s 
framework applies to AUMF). 
31. Dr. Lieber was the principal author of what has become known as the Lieber Code that was 
eventually issued by President Lincoln as General Orders 100. See generally Instructions for the Government 
of Armies of the United States in the Field (1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A 
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & JiĜí Toman 
eds., 1988) (1973) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. See infra notes 180–81 and accompanying text for further 
discussion of the Lieber Code. 
32. United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227 (1887). See infra notes 260–64 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of this case. 
33. See, e.g., Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Timothy Flanigan, 
Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations 
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Yoo Memo], in TORTURE 
PAPERS, supra note 11, at 3, 7 (“[I]t is clear that Congress’s power to declare war does not constrain the 
President’s independent and plenary constitutional authority over the use of military force.”). 
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of even specifically applicable law.34 Although the new Administration appears to 
subscribe to a more judicious view of presidential power, the retrenchment has 
prompted equally erroneous claims by some commentators that war powers are limited 
to those expressly granted either in domestic legislation, or by relevant international 
laws regulating international or non-international armed conflict,35 known as 
international humanitarian law.36 This Article attempts a more balanced conceptual 
understanding of both the breadth and limits of the President’s powers to conduct war. 
II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS OVER THE 
ARMED FORCES 
While the Constitution designates the President as Commander-in-Chief,37 the 
powers to declare war,38 as well as to raise, maintain, and make rules for the 
government and regulation of the armed forces are textually committed to Congress.39 
The Constitution appears to grant Congress authority to create, govern, and employ the 
military and the President the authority to command it. This arrangement was created 
not only to ensure that any national military would remain generally subordinate to 
civilian authority,40 but also to prevent executive misuse of the military in both 
domestic and international affairs.41 
 
34. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Bybee Memo], in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 11, at 172, 200 (asserting that “if an interrogation 
method arguably were to violate” federal criminal statute prohibiting torture “the statute would be 
unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President’s constitutional power to conduct a military 
campaign”). By some accounts, this approach appears to have been adopted not only due to the nature of the 
threats to the nation posed by international terrorism, but also from fear of political consequences for failing to 
prevent another attack. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 71–76 (demonstrating immense political pleasure on 
Bush Administration to develop defense initiative to prevent future terrorist attacks). 
35. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, The Obama Administration’s Total Misinterpretation of IHL Regarding 
the Authority to Detain Suspected Terrorists, EJIL: TALK! (March 14, 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
obama-administrations-total-misinterpretation-of-ihl-regarding-the-authority-to-detain-suspected-terrorists/ 
(arguing international or domestic law must expressly authorize detention and that neither does so in non-
international armed conflicts). 
36. In this Article, the terms “laws of war,” “international humanitarian law,” and “international laws 
governing war” are used interchangeably.  It will not attempt to reconcile the ongoing debate about the extent 
to which international human rights law supplements or complements international humanitarian law. On this 
topic, see generally Marco Sassòli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian 
and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599 (2008). 
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
38. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
39. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–14. 
40. Some social scientists believe that the divided nature of civilian authority detracts from ultimate 
civilian control. See, e.g., SAMUEL S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 191 (2d ed. 1985) (“The real 
constitutional stumbling block to objective civilian control [of the military] is the separation of powers . . . . 
[I]ts impact is felt throughout the armed forces. Short of fundamental constitutional change, the separation of 
powers cannot be altered. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether, even if such change were possible, it 
would be worth the price.”); see also PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS 294–95 (2003) (adopting principal-agent model for analyzing civilian control of 
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This Part briefly analyzes a primary source of the modern confusion regarding the 
separation of powers over the military and contrasts it with evidence of the founding 
era understandings. It concludes that Congress was historically understood to be the 
superior regulatory authority in matters involving the national armed forces. 
A. The Commander-in-Chief Power and the Logical Fallacy of Jackson’s Third Tier 
Contemporary commentary on the separation of war powers often conflates 
executive powers rather than isolating its components.42 Much of this scholarship also 
considers Justice Jackson’s three-tiered approach to analyzing the constitutional 
propriety of presidential action.43 Recent scholarship has shifted the focus of the 
 
military and concluding that divided nature of civilian government allows military to pursue independent 
policy preferences through its principal of choice). 
41. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 65 (John Jay) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1866) (“[A]bsolute monarchs 
will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, 
such as, a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize 
or support their particular families, or partizans.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra, at 92 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(discussing threat to civil liberties posed by constant war and standing armies, concluding “[i]t is of the nature 
of war to increase the executive, at the expense of the legislative authority”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra, 
at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining importance of vesting power to raise armies in legislature such that 
executive does not possess “the whole power of levying troops” or ability to maintain standing armies without 
“evident necessity”). 
42. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 249 (2007) 
(claiming “the President has authority to conduct war to the extent of the executive power” and thus “cannot 
take every action that furthers the war effort”). Professor Ramsey’s treatment of the matter is ambiguous 
precisely because he does not isolate the powers of the President. Ramsey asserts that the President “may 
direct the movements of the military in ways that do not attack another” nation, leaving “many controversial 
deployments within the President’s power.” Id. at 247. While this may be true, it is necessary to more carefully 
examine and define the commander-in-chief power to prevent the presidency’s accruing or being attributed the 
fuller foreign affairs powers of an eighteenth-century British monarch. See, e.g., YOO, supra note 16, at 143 
(claiming “the Framers believed that separating the president’s executive and commander-in-chief powers 
from Congress’s powers over declaring war and funding would create a political system in which in [sic] each 
branch could use its own constitutional powers to develop foreign policy” without establishing a hierarchy in 
shared powers). 
43. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). In 
Jackson’s opinion, presidential actions supported by an express or implied congressional grant of authority fall 
into the first or highest category of presidential power, where his authority “is at its maximum” and he 
“personif[ies] the federal sovereignty.” Id. at 635–36. Presidential actions neither supported by an express or 
implied congressional grant of authority, nor contrary to an express or implied congressional denial of 
authority, fall into an intermediate category where “there is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” Id. at 637. In the final or 
third category, “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Id. In spite of its status as only an element of a concurring opinion, 
Justice Jackson’s three-tiered analytical framework continues to dominate scholarship over the relative powers 
of Congress and the Executive in matters of war and foreign affairs. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman I, supra 
note 15, at 720–25 (establishing framework for evaluating disputes falling into Jackson’s “third tier”); Bradley 
& Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 2050–52, 2096–2100 (analyzing Bush Administration’s actions following 9/11 
and AUMF under Jackson’s three-tier frame). Its utility has been critically and appropriately questioned. See 
RAMSEY, supra note 42, at 51–73, 91–114 (arguing political history of separation of powers contradicts 
Jackson’s analysis in Youngstown). But see MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 42–70 
(1990) (analyzing various separation of powers theories, including Justice Jackson’s, and proposing a 
different, hierarchical methodology for resolving separation of powers disputes). 
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analysis from the so-called “second tier” of Jackson’s framework, under which 
presidential power to initiate war without affirmative congressional sanction is 
analyzed, to the “third tier,” under which claims of plenary presidential war-fighting 
authority that run counter to the express or implied will of Congress are considered.44 
Justice Jackson’s third tier is more completely articulated as follows: 
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in 
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. 
Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be 
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by 
our constitutional system.45 
This third tier logically invites—but does not require—scholars to contemplate the 
notion of an “indefeasible” or “preclusive” core of presidential power.46 In order to 
apply it one must first determine the constitutional validity of any congressional 
enactment or implied disapproval restricting the President’s action. If the relevant 
congressional action is a valid exercise of Congress’s express or implied powers, one 
must then analyze whether Congress’s preferences control the actions of a President, or 
if the President possesses an indefeasible residuum of power. This invites a search for a 
theoretical plenary or preclusive ‘core’ of presidential power not subject to regulation, 
the sources of which are not entirely clear.47 
Jackson’s third tier certainly implies that some indefeasible core of power might 
exist in the President. His subtraction formulation (the President’s “constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress”) suggests that the President’s 
powers must either exceed those of Congress or be irreducible by Congressional 
enactment.48 But Jackson quickly cautioned against ‘conclusive’ or ‘preclusive’ claims 
of presidential power and urged careful scrutiny of them. Heeding Jackson’s 
admonition requires close examination into the fundamental nature of congressional 
and executive powers relevant to a given matter that might, if not observed, threaten the 
‘constitutional equilibrium.’ 
The analysis that follows demonstrates that it is a mistake to equate the inherent 
and admittedly broad authorities of the Commander-in-Chief with the existence of a 
 
44. See Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 695–96 (explaining that whether President has exclusive 
and preclusive powers as Commander-in-Chief has not been satisfactorily analyzed). 
45. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
46. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 726–29 (presenting core/periphery approach to 
third-tier questions). 
47. See id. at 726–32 (evaluating potential sources of preclusive presidential power). 
48. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 236–37 (2005) 
(“[T]he Constitution expressly authorizes regulation of certain presidential powers. That being the case, if we 
were to divide presidential powers into a regulable periphery and an unregulable core, it seems natural that the 
only regulable powers are those the Constitution expressly makes so.” (footnote omitted)). Barron and 
Lederman go to great length to show that Prakash is inconsistent on the core/periphery issue. Barron & 
Lederman I, supra note 15, at 727 n.108. 
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preclusive or indefeasible ‘core’ within them.49 Although Barron and Lederman begin 
their analysis of Commander-in-Chief powers with the assumption that a core might 
somewhere exist,50 one does not necessarily follow from the other. Neither Justice 
Jackson’s framework nor other methods of analyzing the constitutional distribution of 
war powers have been used by the Supreme Court to support a decision in favor of a 
President as Commander-in-Chief against an applicable congressional prohibition or 
limitation. Although the Court ultimately adopted a somewhat modified version of 
Jackson’s tiers in Dames & Moore v. Regan,51 that case dealt primarily with a general 
foreign affairs power to settle the claims of U.S. nationals rather than with the 
Commander-in-Chief power.52 It also did not involve a relevant express or implied 
congressional disapproval.53 
The executive surely possesses some measure of general foreign affairs powers 
through which a President may establish national policy.54 A President might then 
implement such policy, as appropriate, through orders to the armed forces.55 This 
analysis simply concludes that the Commander-in-Chief power does not necessarily 
independently add to the substance or scope of any such powers.56 The remainder of 
this section more fully examines the fundamental nature of the Commander-in-Chief 
and congressional powers over the armed forces. 
 
49. See Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 726–31 (discussing notion of “core” and “peripheral” 
Article II powers in which core powers may not be regulated by Congress but peripheral powers may). 
50. Barron and Lederman state that: 
[T]he most useful way to frame the question is to draw important distinctions among the authorities 
that the Commander in Chief Clause conveys to the President—to identify the preclusive core, if 
any, of the President’s war powers and to distinguish it from the remaining, more “peripheral” 
Commander in Chief powers that are subject to statutory and treaty-based regulation. 
Id. at 721. A corollary to this approach, one that was particularly prominent in the Bush Administration’s 
Office of Legal Counsel, is to narrowly interpret laws potentially delimiting presidential discretion to avoid 
“serious constitutional problems.” Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1203, 1192–96 (2006). The logical fallacy of beginning a legal analysis with the 
assumption that a serious constitutional problem must be avoided before it has been discovered should be as 
self-evident as starting such analyses with an assumption that a preclusive core of power might exist. 
51. 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (“[I]t is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance 
falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit 
congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.”). 
52. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654. 
53. In fact, the Court indicated it would be less likely to find implied congressional disapproval in the 
context of foreign affairs. Id. at 678 (stating that “failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does 
not, especially . . . in the areas of foreign policy and national security, imply congressional disapproval of 
action taken by the Executive” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
54. See generally RAMSEY, supra note 42, at 51–131. 
55. See supra note 42 for a discussion of the President’s power to direct the armed forces. 
56. Conflating these two powers appears to have been a preferred approach of former executive branch 
attorneys. See, e.g., Yoo Memo, supra note 33, at 3–4 (“[T]he Constitution vests the President with the plenary 
authority, as Commander in Chief and the sole organ of the Nation in its foreign relations, to use military force 
abroad.”). 
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B. The Constitutional Design and Military Regulation 
There is little question that the Framers adopted a new approach to command and 
control of national armed forces. By vesting Commander-in-Chief authority in the 
President while placing the authority to raise, maintain, govern, and regulate the 
military in Congress, the Constitution broke with the condition then existing in Great 
Britain. Alexander Hamilton described the difference as follows: 
The president is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the 
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with 
that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It 
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of 
the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy; 
while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the 
raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution 
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.57 
While some commentary has suggested that this relative vesting of constitutional 
powers over the military implies that the President has no power to regulate the 
military,58 this is clearly inaccurate. The directive authority of military command 
equates to a near infinite power of internal regulation.59 A commander need not 
repeatedly issue the same order to assert his or her directive authority over routine 
tasks. Effective command requires that many directives be made generally applicable 
and remain in effect until rescinded or superseded.60 Therefore, some power to 
establish standing orders, or regulations, must necessarily exist.61 As Madison 
explained, “[n]o axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that 
wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do 
a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.”62 This 
understanding was later echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.63 
 
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 41, at 515–16 (Alexander Hamilton). 
58. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power, the Commander in Chief, and the Militia Clause, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 321 (2005) (arguing that grant of power to Congress implies lack of such power in the 
President). 
59. This directive authority is potentially only one essential legal attribute of command. See 10 U.S.C.   
§ 3583 (2006) (establishing several general and affirmative responsibilities of military commanders); DEP’T OF 
THE ARMY, REG. 600–20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY, subsec. 1–5 (rev. ed. 2010) (2008) (describing military 
command as essentially a fiduciary relationship, by which authority over others creates corresponding 
responsibilities). 
60. Congress has endorsed this principle in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (codified at 10 
U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (2006)). See 10 U.S.C. § 892(1) (permitting punishment for violation of “any lawful 
general order or regulation.” (emphasis added)). 
61. Id. 
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 41, at 354 (James Madison). 
63. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Justice Marshall famously stated that the Constitution marks 
“only its great outlines” and designates only “important objects,” but “the minor ingredients which compose 
those objects [must] be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.” Id. at 407. Marshall continued: 
But it may with great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted with such ample powers, on 
the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also 
be entrusted with ample means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the 
nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and cannot be presumed to have been 
their intention, to clog and embarrass its execution by withholding the most appropriate means. 
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Equally clear was both Madison and Marshall’s belief that these ‘necessary’ powers are 
implied from the nature of the power expressly granted.64 The general directive 
authority intrinsic to “military command” is undoubtedly why the Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld the internal regulatory authority of the Commander-in-Chief and 
his subordinate commanders.65 
C. Practice in Great Britain and the U.S. 
On the other hand, military command authority, including the authority of a 
commander-in-chief, has always been subject to a superior authority. A superior 
authority may set affirmative requirements or establish limits that cabin a subordinate’s 
discretion. Indeed, merely designating a specific scope of command is itself a limit on 
that subordinate’s discretion. 
Subjecting the supreme national military commander to the control of a superior 
political authority is reflected in both British and American practice. As noted by 
Barron and Lederman, when Great Britain designated a commander-in-chief, it not 
only set specific, if broad, goals or limits for the military objects of his command but 
also declared him subject to both Parliament and the Sovereign for the duration of his 
appointment.66 It was “a purely military post under the command of political 
superiors.”67 Specific regulations governing the conduct, care, and discipline of a 
commander’s soldiers were articulated by the British Sovereign in Articles of War.68 
Likewise, from the beginning of the Union, Congress has imposed obligations and 
placed limits on the military and its commanders. The Continental Congress adapted 
Articles of War from the British and enacted them in 1775 when it raised an army to 
protect the colonists.69 After the ratification of the Constitution, the Articles, with 
 
Id. at 408. 
64. Madison explained that “all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers 
[granted the Federal government] would . . . result to the government, by unavoidable implication.” THE 
FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 41, at 354 (James Madison); see also McCulloch, 317 U.S. at 409–10 (“The 
government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, 
according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means.”). 
65. See Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 503 (1885) (“Army Regulations derive their force from the 
power of the President as commander-in-chief, and are binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and 
constitutional authority.”); Gratiot v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 80, 117–18 (1846) (“As to the army 
regulations, this court has too repeatedly said, that they have the force of law, to make it proper to discuss that 
point anew, and such of them as were assailed in the case by counsel, as not warranted by law, the court think 
are as obligatory as any of the rest.”); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 567 (1845) (“Army 
Regulations, when sanctioned by the President, have the force of law, because it is done by him by the 
authority of law.”); United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 301 (1842) (“The power of the executive to 
establish rules and regulations for the government of the army, is undoubted.”). 
66. Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 772–73. 
67. Id. at 772 (citing 1 CHARLES M. CLODE, THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN: THEIR 
ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT 425–59 (London, John Murray 1869)). 
68. E.g., Articles of War of James II (1688), reprinted in 2 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND 
PRECEDENTS 1434 (1886). 
69. 1 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra note 68, at 11–12; see also American Articles of War of 
1775, reprinted in 2 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra note 68, at 1478. 
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interim modifications, were adopted by Congress and later completely reenacted in 
1806.70 
The Articles regulated military forces in very specific ways that one might not 
expect. They encouraged attendance at “divine service” and permitted the punishment 
of any indecent or irreverent behavior at such services.71 They provided specific 
guidance on ministerial tasks such as the inventory and forwarding of the personal 
effects of officers and soldiers who died in service.72 The Articles required 
commanding officers to punish soldiers under their command for “abuses or disorders” 
affecting the public and to make reparations for any damages done.73 A failure to do so 
subjected the responsible commanding officer to punishment.74 The 1806 Articles also 
placed specific limits on the disciplinary authority of all military commanders, 
including certain minimal prepunishment procedures, as well as limits on the types and 
amounts of punishment.75 Through the Articles, Congress exercised detailed control 
over the day-to-day discipline and operation of the armed forces. 
The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Articles, as well as the content 
and progression of their terms, also reveal something about the original understanding 
of Congress’s relationship to the military. The pre-constitutional 1775 Articles 
punished “contempt or disrespect towards the general or generals, or commanders in 
chief of the continental forces.”76 In the post-ratification 1806 Articles, these were 
separate provisions. One article punished contempt toward the President, Vice 
President, and Congress, and another punished contempt toward commanding 
officers.77 From this it seems that Congress replaced the respect due to the ‘generals’ or 
‘commanders in chief,’ with a broad view of their constitutional successors— 
successors not limited to the President. 
If the Continental Congress was both executive and legislative in nature, then it 
enacted the 1775 Articles as the appropriate sovereign political authority, just as had 
the monarch in Britain. Congress’s post-ratification adoption and 1806 reenactment of 
 
70. 1 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra note 68, at 14. 
71. American Articles of War of 1775, art. II, supra note 69, at 1478–79; American Articles of War of 
1776, § 1, art. 2, reprinted in 2 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra note 68, at 1489, 1489; American 
Articles of War of 1806, § 1, art. 2, reprinted in 2 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra note 68, at 1509, 
1509. 
72. American Articles of War of 1806, § 1, arts. 94–95, supra note 71, at 1521. 
73. Id. § 1, art. 32, at 1513. 
74. Id. 
75. E.g., id. § 1, arts. 4–9, 12–14, at 1509–11 (articles 4–9 detail limits to authority; 12–14 detail types of 
punishment). 
76. American Articles of War of 1775, art. IV, supra note 69, at 1479. 
77. American Articles of War of 1806, § 1, arts. 5–6, supra note 71, at 1509–10. The provision 
punishing contempt toward high government officials also punished contempt toward “the Chief Magistrate or 
Legislature of any of the United States, in which he may be quartered.” Id. § 1, art. 5, at 1509. Hence, respect 
for state executives and legislatures—in command of their local militias before being called into federal 
service—was apparently perceived as important to military discipline as respect for the political branches of 
the national government. 
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the Articles demonstrates its understanding that it retained this regulatory element of 
what had been executive authority in Great Britain, precisely as Hamilton articulated.78 
Congress did not shrink from subjecting the military and its Commander-in-Chief 
to its regulatory authority, addressing anything it thought proper. This included matters 
not only of military conduct, as discussed above, but also matters of more general 
military governance, such as recruitment, armaments, and even specific rations.79 A 
dearth of provisions in the 1806 Articles vested or recognized specific powers in the 
President as Commander-in-Chief. One such provision, Article 100, empowered the 
President “to prescribe the uniform of the army.”80 The 1806 Articles vested certain 
commanders, but not the President, with the power to convene courts-martial and to 
“pardon or mitigate any punishment” with exceptions regarding the sentence of death, 
which could be suspended until the “pleasure of the President of the United States can 
be known.”81 
One additional feature of the Articles is of note. Article 10 required non-
commissioned officers and soldiers enlisting in the “service of the United States” to 
swear an oath to “observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States, and 
the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the Rules and Articles for the 
government of the armies of the United States.”82 While this oath recognized the 
authority of the President over the nation’s military, it also conveyed a superior 
regulatory authority in Congress. 
It is against this history that G. Norman Lieber,83 in describing the relative powers 
of Congress and the President to regulate the armed forces, stated 
no distinct line can be drawn separating the President’s constitutional power 
to make [regulations] from the constitutional power of Congress “to make 
rules for the government and regulation” of the land forces. Regulations are, 
when they relate to subjects within the constitutional jurisdiction of 
Congress, unquestionably of a legislative character, and if it were practicable 
for Congress completely to regulate the methods of military administration, 
it might, under the Constitution, do so. But it is entirely impracticable, and 
therefore it is in a great measure left to the President to do it. So far as 
Congress chooses to exercise its jurisdiction in this respect it occupies the 
field, and the President can not encroach on it.84 
 
78. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the respective scope of executive 
powers in the United States and Britain. 
79. Barron & Lederman have identified a substantial array of early statutes that regulate everything from 
the physical characteristics of recruits, to the number and type of armaments aboard naval vessels, to 
requirements for food rations, including on which days they should be served. See Barron & Lederman II, 
supra note 15, at 957–58. 
80. American Articles of War of 1806, § 1, art. 100, supra note 71, at 1522. 
81. Id. § 1, art. 89, at 1520. The potential for an inherent presidential power to convene courts-martial 
was addressed in Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 557–58 (1897). 
82. American Articles of War of 1806, § 1, art. 10, supra note 71, at 1510 (emphasis added). 
83. G. Norman Lieber is the son of Dr. Francis Lieber, discussed supra note 31, and a former Head 
Professor of Law at the United States Military Academy. 
84. G. NORMAN LIEBER, REMARKS ON THE ARMY REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS IN 
GENERAL 11–16 (War Dep’t 1898). 
  
616 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
The logic of this position is clear and virtually indisputable. Congress’s regulatory 
authority is express. The Commander-in-Chief’s is implied from the nature of military 
command. To the extent they are exercised in harmony, they co-exist and are equally 
binding on the armed forces. In the event of conflict, the entity possessing the express 
power, Congress, prevails over that with merely implied power. 
This brief review reveals an original understanding that Congress was the 
supreme authority in matters of military governance and regulation. The Commander-
in-Chief Clause was not understood to vest the independent authorities of the British 
monarch. It appears, instead, to contain the much different authority of a supreme field 
commander, subject to the complete political control of Congress. 
Other congressional powers address the nation’s conduct in war, such as the 
powers to make rules for captures on land and water85 and to define and punish 
offenses against the laws of nations.86 Congress’s power to regulate the national armed 
forces is legally sufficient to govern their conduct in both peace and war. When other 
constitutional powers are employed, the remaining analysis reveals that there is no 
doubt that they also cabin the Commander-in-Chief’s discretion in armed conflict. They 
are only necessary, however, to govern matters beyond the military’s control or 
purview—i.e., to prescribe national policy applicable both within and beyond the 
military.87 
III. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS OVER ARMED 
CONFLICT 
The Supreme Court recognized Congress’s superior authority over the nation’s 
wars in the oft-cited early nineteenth century cases of Bas v. Tingy,88 Talbot v. 
Seeman,89 Little v. Barreme,90 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,91 and Brown 
v. United States,92 among others. Because of their proximity to constitutional 
ratification and the fundamental principles they clarify, these cases require detailed 
consideration. While the Court was not always clear regarding which of Congress’s 
war- or military-related powers were at issue, a firm understanding of Congress’s 
supreme powers over war, including its objects, scope, and means, is readily apparent. 
A. Identifying Public Enemies—Bas and Talbot 
Bas v. Tingy, decided in 1800, is unremarkable for its precise holding. The 
seriatim opinions of the Justices, however, reveal an important early unanimity of 
 
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
86. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and 
Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843 (2007) (arguing Congress’s define and 
punish power could be used to punish individuals or states). 
87. See generally Kent, supra note 86. 
88. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
89. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). 
90. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
91. (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
92. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
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understanding regarding Congress’s war powers. The relevant statute in Bas was 
enacted during what is often referred to as a limited or quasi-war with France. 
Justice Chase summarized the relevant facts and legal issue: “An American public 
vessel of war re-captures an American merchant vessel from a French privateer, after 
96 hours possession, and the question is stated, what salvage ought to be allowed?”93 
There were two potentially applicable statutes “by the first of which, only one-eighth of 
the value of the re-captured property is allowed; but by the second, the re-captor [was] 
entitled to [half].”94 The correct statute to be applied depended upon whether France 
was an enemy nation at the time of capture.95 If France was properly considered an 
enemy, then the re-captor was entitled to half the value of the ship and its cargo.96 
At no time prior to the second statute’s reference to an “enemy” had the United 
States or France declared war. However, each Justice’s opinion concurred that France 
was properly considered an enemy based solely on congressional enactments 
authorizing various, limited hostilities against it.97 In addition, each Justice affirmed in 
the course of his opinion that, especially given the limited nature of the conflict, 
Congress possessed the power to dictate both the general scope and precise means of 
executing the war.98 
The next year, the Court reiterated the primacy of Congress’s war powers in 
clearer and stronger terms. Talbot v. Seeman involved a vessel belonging to a citizen of 
the then-sovereign city of Hamburgh, neutral as to the limited conflict then existing 
between the United States and France.99 The vessel had been recaptured from the 
French by the USS Constitution, commanded by Captain Talbot.100 The central issue 
was whether Captain Talbot could present a claim for compensation (known as 
“salvage”) and if so, for how much.101 
A newly-minted Chief Justice, John Marshall, delivered the Court’s opinion. In 
determining the relative rights of the parties, he began by recognizing that: 
 The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, 
vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our 
guides in this enquiry. It is not denied, nor in the course of the argument has 
it been denied, that congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case 
the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which 
case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must be 
noticed. 
 To determine the real situation of America in regard to France, the acts of 
congress are to be inspected.102 
 
93. Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43 (Chase, J.). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 39 (Moore, J.); id. at 42 (Washington, J.); id. at 44–45 (Chase, J.); id. at 45 (Paterson, J.). 
98. Id. at 39 (Moore, J.); id. at 41 (Washington, J.); id. at 43 (Chase, J.); id. at 45 (Paterson, J.). 
99. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 27 (1801). 
100. Id. at 26–27. 
101. Id. at 27–28. 
102. Id. at 28–29. Marshall’s words are similar to those of Justice Chase in Bas, where he opined that: 
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Marshall then meticulously navigated the congressional enactments authorizing various 
hostilities in the limited, undeclared war. One key element of his inquiry was whether 
the capture of the vessel was consistent with any congressional authorization. Finding 
that Talbot had probable cause to believe that the vessel was subject to capture under 
one of the many acts governing the conflict, Marshall concluded that it was.103 
After determining that Congress had not spoken to the precise issue of 
compensation for the recapture of a neutral vessel, Marshall examined the law of 
nations, relevant French prize law, and even general principles of law.104 He ultimately 
concluded that Talbot, although not expressly entitled to salvage under any 
congressional enactment, was entitled to salvage under general principles of law for a 
benefit rendered to the vessel’s owner.105 
When considering the legality of the capture, Marshall did not address the content 
or form of any orders from the President pursuant to which Captain Talbot acted. 
Presumably, they were not relevant because the capture itself was reasonably within 
both the scope of relevant acts of Congress and any orders to Captain Talbot as well. 
However, the court would later have occasion to consider what would result if the case 
had been otherwise. 
B. Regulating the Scope of Hostilities—Little v. Berreme 
Three years later, in Little v. Berreme, the Court addressed another situation 
involving limited hostilities with France, and resolved a conflict between the President 
and Congress. To implement a policy prohibiting commercial intercourse, Congress 
authorized only the seizure of American ships bound to French ports.106 Pursuant to 
more liberal orders from the President,107 a United States naval commander, Captain 
Little, seized and sought condemnation of a Danish ship (on the suspicion that it was 
American) traveling from a French to a Danish port.108 Although Captain Little’s 
actions complied with the President’s orders, they violated the terms of the statute.109 
 
Congress has not declared war in general terms; but congress has authorised hostilities on the high 
seas by certain persons in certain cases. There is no authority given to commit hostilities on land; to 
capture unarmed French vessels, nor even to capture French armed vessels lying in a French port; 
and the authority is not given, indiscriminately, to every citizen of America, against every citizen of 
France; but only to citizens appointed by commissions, or exposed to immediate outrage and 
violence. So far it is, unquestionably, a partial war; but, nevertheles [sic], it is a public war, on 
account of the public authority from which it emanates. 
Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43 (Chase, J.) (italics omitted). This idea was also present in the opinion of the other 
justices, particularly Justice Paterson. Id. at 45 (Paterson, J.) (“As far as congress tolerated and authorised the 
war on our part, so far may we proceed in hostile operations.”). 
103. Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 36. 
104. Id. at 36–43. 
105. Id. at 41–43. 
106. Little v. Berreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804). 
107. Id. at 178. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 179. The Court emphasized that the vessel could not have been seized consistently with the 
statute even if it had been American. Id. 
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For that reason the Court, in another opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall, found 
the seizure unlawful and held Captain Little liable for damages.110 
Noticeably absent from the Little opinion is any hint of a constitutional review of 
the power of Congress to enact either the substantive or restrictive-implementing 
measures of its non-intercourse policy in the face of a conflicting presidential order. It 
is not clear pursuant to which constitutional power(s) Congress enacted them. The 
overarching purpose of the non-intercourse law would seem to potentially fall within 
Congress’s power over commerce with foreign nations.111 However, the law’s 
forfeiture provisions and limited authorization to seize and condemn only certain 
American ships is more properly viewed as within one or more of Congress’s war 
powers, such as its power to declare war and to make rules for captures.112 
In any case, the relative powers of the President and Congress over the matter 
were not analyzed, nor were the President’s powers clearly articulated. Marshall only 
gives us a clue as to his thinking on separation of powers issues when he states that: 
It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose high 
duty it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and who is 
commander in chief of the armies and navies of the United States, might not, 
without any special authority for that purpose, in the then existing state of 
things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the 
United States, to seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels 
which were forfeited by being engaged in this illicit commerce.113 
The meaning of this passage is unclear. Some commentators assert that Marshall 
implies that the President might have independently established a non-intercourse and 
forfeiture policy.114 However, Marshall’s reference to the Take Care Clause, and to the 
President empowering military officers to seize vessels that had engaged in illicit 
 
110. Id. 
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
112. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. The law seems to reflect a desire by Congress to adopt the law of nations 
principle that states may terminate and punish intercourse between its nationals and public enemies. See, e.g., 
FRANCIS H. UPTON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR: WITH A REVIEW OF THE 
JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS OF PRIZE COURTS 6–7 (1863). For additional information, see 
Lieber Code, supra note 31, art. 86 which provides that in war 
[a]ll intercourse between the territories occupied by belligerent armies, whether by traffic, by letter, 
by travel, or in any other way, ceases. This is the general rule, to be observed without special 
proclamation. 
 Exceptions to this rule, whether by safe-conduct, or permission to trade on a small or large scale, 
or by exchanging mails, or by travel from one territory into the other, can take place only according 
to agreement approved by the government, or by the highest military authority. 
This principle would deem an American citizen’s property to be enemy property subject to capture and 
forfeiture. See also infra notes 193–212 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Prize Cases, 67 U.S.   
(2 Black) 635 (1863) and infra notes 255–59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Juragua Iron Co. v. 
United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1908). 
113. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177 (italics omitted). 
114. See RAMSEY, supra note 42, at 255 (believing that Marshall left aside the issue of “whether the 
President could order such seizures without authorization”); Barron & Lederman II, supra note 15, at 969 
(equating the quoted passage to Marshall’s alleged belief that “the President might well have had the inherent 
constitutional power to issue such an order in the absence of a statute” (emphasis added)). 
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commerce indicates that Marshall is referring to the policy then in existence, not to one 
that might be independently established. 
Marshall does not address whether commercial intercourse in a limited rather than 
a general state of war was presumptively terminated under the international law of that 
era. That seems unlikely given the very nature of a limited war. In light of Marshall’s 
usual reference to relevant international law, as well as his above-quoted opinion in 
Talbot regarding the limited applicability of the laws of war to a limited war,115 the 
absence of this discussion indicates that this commerce was not deemed illicit by 
relevant international law. 
Marshall must, therefore, be referring to Congress’s designation of this commerce 
as illicit, and not to any inherent presidential authority to prohibit and punish it. If so, 
the above passage referred only to whether the President would have implied 
authority—given the Take Care and Commander-in-Chief Clauses—to employ the 
armed vessels of the United States to implement the non-intercourse policy enacted by 
Congress without express authority to do so. 
The difference between implementing an existing, congressional non-intercourse 
policy and any alleged authority to independently establish such a policy is clearly an 
important one. In this context, it relates to whether the President has independent, 
national policy-making authority in identifying the scope or means of a limited war 
rather than merely discretionary implementation authority. A narrower reading is more 
consistent with Marshall’s opinion in Talbot, recognizing the broad powers of 
Congress over war and the limited applicability of the international laws of war in a 
limited or imperfect war.116 
What is very clear is that Marshall did not search for a preclusive core of 
presidential or Commander-in-Chief power over the navy, over national wartime 
policy, or over the conduct of the non-intercourse ‘campaign.’ This despite the fact that 
he recognized that the President’s order was probably better calculated to achieve 
Congress’s overarching non-intercourse policy.117 Instead, Marshall found that 
Congress’s targeted enforcement and specific limitations delimited the permissible 
scope of Captain Little’s actions notwithstanding the President’s order.118 The only 
difficulty Marshall expressed with the case was whether it was proper to hold Captain 
Little liable for damages even though he had complied with an order from his 
Commander-in-Chief.119 As Michael Glennon has noted, “[Marshall’s] decision seems 
 
115. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for Marshall’s recognition in Talbot that the 
applicability of international laws of war depended on the nature of the conflict. 
116. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
117. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 178. 
118. Id. at 177–79. 
119. Id. at 178–79. Marshall acknowledged that, “[the] implicit obedience which military men usually 
pay to the orders of their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared 
to me strongly to imply the principle that those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the 
person whose general duty it is to obey them.” Id. at 179. 
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to presuppose that congressional authorization of a specific scope of executive action is 
an implicit denial to the President of authority to order action outside that scope.”120 
C. The Effect of International Law—Charming Betsy and Brown 
That international law was to be observed by courts deciding cases involving the 
nation’s armed conflicts had been made clear by Marshall’s earlier referenced opinion 
in Talbot declaring that such laws “must be noticed.”121 The Supreme Court 
consistently adhered to this approach in its early cases, two of the more prominent of 
which are analyzed here. 
Decided the same year as Little, Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy 
involved a law prohibiting all forms of commercial intercourse between the United 
States and France (passed after the capture at issue in Little, which had been 
adjudicated under an earlier statute).122 The USS Constellation recaptured the 
Charming Betsy from the French. Although she had been sold by American citizens to 
an American-born Danish burgher engaged in commerce with France,123 the vessel had 
been captured by a French privateer.124 This capture supported the apparent view of the 
Constellation’s commander that the sale was a sham and that the true owner was 
actually an American engaged in prohibited commerce.125 
The Court found that the burgher owned the vessel and that he was properly 
considered a subject of Denmark—a neutral party to the limited conflict between 
France and the United States.126 Marshall then observed, “the building of vessels in the 
United States for sale to neutrals, in the islands, is, during war, a profitable business, 
which Congress cannot be intended to have prohibited, unless that intent be manifested 
by express words or a very plain and necessary implication.”127 Marshall later 
concluded “that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains.”128 This phrase, now commonly 
referred to as the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation and applied in a 
variety of contexts,129 was first used to narrow the executive’s discretion in war. 
 
120. GLENNON, supra note 43, at 7. Glennon also noted that Marshall did not find the case to be a 
political question unsuitable for judicial resolution, even though he had announced the principle less than one 
year earlier in Marbury v. Madison. Id. 
121. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Talbot. 
122. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 116 (1804). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 116–17. There would be no logical reason for the French to capture the vessel except on the 
belief that it was American, and hence “enemy” property. 
125. Id. at 116. 
126. Id. at 120–21. This may have been because a Danish consul advanced the claim on the burgher’s 
behalf. Id. at 116. 
127. Id. at 118 (italics omitted). 
128. Id. 
129. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 488–91 (1998) (outlining various ways in which 
Charming Betsy canon has been used as interpretive tool to avoid construing statutes as violating or permitting 
violation of various treaty and customary international law obligations). 
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Applying this canon, the Court interpreted an act of Congress authorizing certain 
hostilities to exclude acts prohibited by international law pertaining to neutrals.130 
In the context of this case and Marshall’s prior opinions, this canon is based upon 
three key understandings regarding the nation’s conduct of war. First, similar to Little, 
it strongly implies that only Congress can dictate the scope and means of hostilities in 
which the United States will engage.131 Second, it indicates that the courts (and 
implicitly the executive) are required to interpret any such statutory authority with 
respect to relevant international law in order to preserve Congress’s prerogatives.132 
Third, it clarifies that the courts, as the Supreme Court had done in Bas and Little, may 
review factual and/or legal determinations of the executive branch regarding whether 
individuals or property are within the scope of hostilities authorized by Congress.133 
Brown v. United States provides a similar view of congressional authority over the 
executive’s adoption of war measures in a declared (or “perfected”) general war. Soon 
after Congress declared a general state of war with Great Britain in 1812, timber 
belonging to a British company was seized and a district attorney acting on his own 
initiative sought its condemnation as enemy property.134 The district court’s dismissal 
of the case was reversed by the circuit court, which condemned the property as enemy 
property forfeited to the United States.135 
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, but Marshall’s opinion is not a 
model of clarity. He initially stated that seizing property of enemy nationals was a 
sovereign right of war.136 Overlooked by many commentators, however, is the fact that 
Marshall immediately qualified this statement by noting that “[t]he mitigations of this 
rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times has introduced into 
practice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair the right 
 
130. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 119. 
131. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 63 (2009) (arguing that by using this canon of construction, “Marshall ensured that Congress, rather 
than the Court, would determine whether the [U.S.] should risk foreign conflict”). 
132. Id. at 63–64. Under the law of nations, the property of nationals of neutral countries was not subject 
to capture if engaged in international trade in ports not subject to blockade. Doing so would have been 
considered an act of war against the neutral nation. See UPTON, supra note 112, at 259–77 (providing overview 
of prize law). 
133. Another example of the judiciary closely supervising the executive branch’s understanding and 
application of congressionally sanctioned hostilities is The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 431 (1815), in 
which the Court exempted the goods of a Spanish (neutral) national on an English (enemy) vessel from 
capture. These decisions undermine recent assertions that the President must necessarily have or is 
constitutionally vested with broad, unreviewable discretion in this area. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that because President “determined that Yaser Hamdi is an 
enemy combatant and should be detained” and the “detention falls squarely within the Federal Government's 
war powers,” the Court lacks “expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision”); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 
727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (2010) (holding that claim by father of U.S. citizen targeted for killing by executive 
branch could not be heard because claim presented nonjusticiable political question). 
134. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 121–22 (1814). Although the property had been 
sold to an American citizen, the Court proceeded on the belief that the sale did not change the status of the 
property for purposes of its analysis. Id. at 122. 
135. Id. at 122. 
136. Id. 
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itself.”137 Thus, though Marshall found the right to exist, he also clearly indicated that 
its exercise was qualified by modern practice. 
Marshall later discussed the emerging practice of allowing enemy nationals the 
right to remove commercial property upon the outbreak of war.138 After briefly 
reviewing recent treaty practice and scholarly treatises, Marshall stated that “[t]he 
modern rule then would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to an enemy and 
found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not to be immediately 
confiscated.”139 Referring to this emerging international custom at odds with the 
confiscation and condemnation at issue, and to Congress’s unexercised power to make 
rules for captures, Marshall found the condemnation improper without express 
authorization from Congress.140 
While some claim that Brown affirmatively rejects the notion that the President 
may exercise war powers domestically without express congressional authorization,141 
this is an overstatement. While that is a reasonable interpretation of one aspect of the 
opinion read in isolation,142 Marshall elsewhere noted that it did “not appear that this 
 
137. Id. at 122–23 (emphases added). 
138. Id. at 126–29. 
139. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). Marshall also equated the confiscation of property to the confiscation 
of debts, a practice which had already become obsolete. Id. at 123–24. 
140. Id. at 125–29. 
141. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 43, at 242 (stating that Brown Court held President lacked power to 
seize plaintiff’s property without congressional authorization); RAMSEY, supra note 42, at 249 (“Marshall 
concluded that the President could not seize an enemy alien’s property in the United States without Congress’s 
authorization, even in support of a formally declared war.”); Bellia & Clark, supra note 131, at 72 (asserting 
that Brown “reserved to Congress the power to create or escalate foreign conflict by engaging in an act that the 
law of nations permitted”); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 2093 (“The Court further held that the 
authorization to use force did not support the confiscation, reasoning that the President could not seize enemy 
property in the United States without specific authorization from Congress.”). 
142. Later in the opinion, Marshall stated that: 
 It is urged that, in executing the laws of war, the executive may seize and the Courts condemn all 
property which, according to the modern law of nations, is subject to confiscation, although it might 
require an act of the legislature to justify the condemnation of that property which, according to 
modern usage, ought not to be confiscated. 
 This argument must assume for its basis the position that modern usage constitutes a rule which 
acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and not through the sovereign power. This 
position is not allowed. This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will. 
The rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the 
judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it 
may be disregarded. 
Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128 (emphases added). The emphasized language again highlights the fact that 
Marshall’s principle concern was that the seizure was inconsistent with an emerging rule—or “modern 
usage”—that qualified the right to immediately seize the property of an enemy national. Marshall does not 
indicate whether the President could supply the necessary sovereign act. Given that, in Marshall’s view, the 
modern usage prohibited the seizure, this aspect of the opinion only reemphasizes Congress’s general 
supremacy in matters of war, one which does not necessarily depend upon the location where war powers are 
exercised. This understanding of Marshall’s opinion is supported by his near-contemporaneous concurring 
opinion in The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814). Regarding the characterization of an American 
merchant’s property as “enemy” property because he remained in British territory after the commencement of 
the war, Marshall wrote: 
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seizure was made under any instructions from the president of the United States; nor is 
there any evidence of its having his sanction, unless the libels being filed and 
prosecuted by the law officer who represents the government, must imply that 
sanction.”143 Marshall also believed that certain relevant acts of Congress were 
contrary to an implied executive authority to immediately seize commercial 
property.144 Thus, Marshall had no occasion to consider what he would decide if the 
President had expressly authorized this seizure and condemnation without express 
legislative support.145 In addition, Marshall clarified that the case involved the 
divestment of private property rights, not with more typical war measures against 
enemy nationals or forces.146 These diverse bases for Marshall’s decision caution 
against drawing any general conclusions regarding Marshall’s view on the 
constitutional separation of war powers. 
Justice Story’s dissent supports this more nuanced reading of Marshall’s opinion. 
Story believed that the declaration of war impliedly authorized the President to wage 
war “against the vessels, goods and effects of the British government and its subjects; 
and to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the war into 
effect.”147 At the same time, he recognized that the Court must determine “whether 
congress (for with them rests the sovereignty of the nation as to the right of making 
war, and declaring its limits and effects) have authorized the seizure of enemies’ 
property.”148 On that point, Story’s view was that the general declaration of war 
 
A merchant residing abroad for commercial purposes may certainly intend to continue in the foreign 
country so long as peace shall exist, provided his commercial objects shall detain him so long, but to 
leave it the instant war shall break out between that country and his own. This intention, it is not 
necessary to manifest during peace; and when war shall commence, the belligerent cruizer may find 
his property on the ocean, and may capture it, before he knows that war exists. The question 
whether this be enemy property or not, depends, in my judgment, not exclusively on the residence 
of the owner at the time, but on his residence taken in connexion with his national character as a 
citizen, and with his intention to continue or to discontinue his commercial domicil in the event of 
war. 
Id. at 288. 
143. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 121–22. 
144. Id. at 126–27. 
145. Marshall’s discussion does not indicate whether an act of the President, rather than lower executive 
official, might be an adequate “sovereign” act because, as Marshall earlier recognized, “it is admitted that the 
seizure was made by an individual, and the libel filed at his instance, by the district attorney who acted from 
his own impressions of what appertained to his duty.” Id. at 122 (emphasis added). Given the facts of the case, 
Marshall appears only to be referring to the executive branch generally, and to leave open the question of 
whether the President could provide the requisite “sovereign” act to which Marshall refers. See, e.g., The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (reasoning that “resort must be had to the customs and usages of 
civilized nations” only “where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision” (emphasis added)). 
146. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125–26 (“[T]he declaration of war has only the effect of placing 
the two nations in a state of hostility, of producing a state of war, of giving those rights which war confers; but 
not of operating, by its own force, any of those results, such as a transfer of property, which are usually 
produced by ulterior measures of government.” (emphasis added)). 
147. Id. at 137 (Story, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
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implicitly vested the President with this power under the laws of war in the absence of 
congressional indication to the contrary.149 
After a review of international authorities, Story did not believe that there existed 
any doubt regarding the ability to confiscate an enemy national’s property under the 
circumstances of this case.150 He therefore concluded that the seizure was impliedly 
authorized by the declaration of war.151 Justice Story also noted, however, that the 
confiscation of debts due to enemy subjects was “so justly deemed odious in modern 
times, and is so generally discountenanced, that nothing but an express act of congress 
would satisfy my mind that it ought to be included among the fair objects of 
warfare.”152 
Thus read, Marshall and Story appear to have a very similar basic understanding 
of the Commander-in-Chief power. Both recognized the complete authority of 
Congress over the conduct of even a declared war. They disagreed only as to whether 
the power to immediately confiscate an enemy national’s property upon the declaration 
of war was permitted by the law of nations, and thereby impliedly authorized by 
Congress’s declaration of war. As Story’s discussion of debt confiscation makes clear, 
Story and Marshall also agreed that when the law of nations prohibits or qualifies a 
certain war measure, Congress must speak clearly as to the Executive’s authority to act 
in violation of it. This is precisely what Charming Betsy would require. 
D. Interim Observations 
Fairly comprehensive but not indisputable, these early decisions suggest a 
reasonably uniform understanding that Congress is the supreme political authority in 
the nation’s conduct of both perfect and imperfect war. Congress’s complete authority 
to regulate the objects, scope, and general means of conducting the nation’s wars was a 
key aspect of each opinion. 
The Court’s uniform treatment of the Commander-in-Chief power was that of 
implied powers subordinate to those of Congress. When Congress declared general war 
or authorized specific hostilities in a limited war, these opinions implied from such 
authorization a scope of authority consistent with the congressional authorization and 
relevant international law. Indeed, the application of the Charming Betsy canon to a 
congressional declaration of war or other authorization to engage in hostilities 
necessarily yields this result. 
 
149. See id. (“[A]s the executive of the nation, [the President] must, as an incident of the office, have a 
right to employ all the usual and customary means acknowledged in war, to carry it into effect. . . . In cases 
where no grant is made by congress, all such captures, made under the authority of the executive, must enure 
to the use of the government.”). 
150. See id. at 143 (“In respect to the goods of an enemy found within the dominions of a belligerent 
power, the right of confiscation is most amply admitted by Grotius, and Puffendorf, and Bynkershock, and 
Burlamaqui, and Rutherforth and Vattel.”). 
151. Id. at 145. 
152. Id. at 145–46. 
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IV. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S WAR FIGHTING DISCRETION: THE CONCEPT OF 
MILITARY NECESSITY 
Although the above decisions dealt with limits on executive discretion in armed 
conflict, they did not—with the exception of Justice Story’s dissent in Brown v. United 
States153—speak clearly to the breadth of presidential discretion within congressionally 
defined limits. The above opinions conveyed the idea that congressionally authorized 
war, general or partial, vests the Commander-in-Chief and his military commanders 
with war powers both specifically granted by Congress and clearly implied, and 
thereby limited, by the law of nations relevant to the hostilities authorized. These 
general powers and limits included not only basic war powers to capture enemy 
property and destroy enemy forces,154 but also powers affecting individual rights, such 
as the property rights of neutrals, or the confiscation of the property or debts of enemy 
nationals. 
Recognizing that these general powers and limits exist, however, does not fully 
account for the conduct of war. The power to capture, kill, or gather intelligence 
regarding an enemy does not fully speak to the means that may be employed to do so. 
In Little v.Barreme,155 for example, Congress did not address whether the vessels to be 
captured could be fired upon or threatened with force, or whether they should be 
approached from the port or starboard, bow or stern. So long as a ship was American 
and traveling to a French port, the President and his subordinate commanders were left 
to determine specifically how, when, and where to affect its capture.156 
The regulation of such details, once the realm of customs rooted in religion, 
morality, or chivalry, and observed by honorable warriors, has gradually become the 
subject of international laws of war, now known as international humanitarian law.157 
The discretion to choose among permissible means and methods of war, within the 
limits of these laws, remains largely within the discretion of military commanders, 
including the Commander-in-Chief. This section will demonstrate how this notion is 
reflected in Supreme Court precedent and in the term “military necessity.” It will then 
explore its breadth and limits. 
A. Towards a Concept of Military Necessity 
While the cases discussed earlier focused primarily on the powers of Congress, 
Fleming v. Page158 articulates the broad scope and outer limits of the Commander-in-
Chief’s discretion to adopt war measures. Fleming involved a duty imposed on goods 
from the port of Tampico, a Mexican port then under U.S. military occupation as the 
 
153. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
154. See infra Part IV.D for discussion of the President’s implied power to detain enemy forces in the 
wake of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 
155. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
156. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–79. 
157. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 4 (1959). See generally THE LAWS OF 
WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & 
Mark R. Shulman, eds. 1994) (collecting essays documenting the development and origins of constraints on 
warfare in various historical eras). 
158. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850). 
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result of a war authorized by Congress.159 The essential question before the Court was 
whether Tampico was still a foreign port, rendering the goods “foreign goods” subject 
to the duty.160 
Explaining why Tampico was still properly considered a foreign port, Chief 
Justice Taney clarified that declared wars could not be understood to “be waged for the 
purpose of conquest or the acquisition of territory; nor does the law declaring the war 
imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the United States by 
subjugating the enemy’s country.”161 He observed, “this can be done only by the treaty-
making power or the legislative authority, and is not a part of the power conferred upon 
the President by the declaration of war.”162 
Taney then described the President’s war powers as “purely military,” noting that 
“[a]s commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and 
military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he 
may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.”163 He noted 
that the President “may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty and 
authority of the United States. But his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this 
Union, nor extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before 
assigned to them by the legislative power.”164 
In the context of this case, Taney’s discussion reveals two fundamental aspects of 
the Commander-in-Chief power. First, he clarifies that the Commander-in-Chief’s 
implied powers are broad and include all military measures necessary to defeat and 
subdue an enemy designated by Congress. Second, he makes clear that the scope of 
these implied powers does not include those constitutionally dedicated to another 
branch of the United States government.165 
The breadth of the Commander-in-Chief’s military discretion is reflected not only 
in Taney’s discussion in Fleming and Justice Story’s in Brown,166 but also in the means 
of war that have been adopted and ultimately approved by the Supreme Court. Military 
commissions, used to punish both common crimes and violations of international laws 
governing war, grew out of the necessities of war and military occupation.167 The 
 
159. Fleming, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 614. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 615. 
163. Id. (emphasis added). 
164. Id. In the context of enemy occupation of U.S. territory, the Court had similarly held that while the 
territory did not become foreign territory, U.S. laws were considered suspended while the territory was subject 
to the sovereignty of the enemy nation. United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254 (1819). 
165. Note, though, Taney’s implicit understanding that the “institutions and laws” of the United States 
are usually limited to the territory of the United States. The Court has recently reiterated a presumption against 
extraterritorial application of federal law. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 
(2010) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
166. See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Story’s dissent in Brown 
v. United States. 
167. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 589–90 (2006); 2 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra 
note 68, at 831; see also David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 
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Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status of these purely military tribunals in 
Jecker v. Montgomery.168 
In Jecker, the Court addressed the constitutionality of military prize courts that 
had been established, along with the other military commissions and councils, during 
the occupation of Mexico.169 Regarding the constitutional allocation of this power, 
Taney observed that “[a]ll captures jure belli are for the benefit of the sovereign under 
whose authority they are made; and the validity of the seizure and the question of prize 
or no prize can be determined in his own courts only, upon which he has conferred 
jurisdiction to try the question.”170 He then determined that “under the Constitution of 
the United States the judicial power of the general government is vested in one 
Supreme Court” and the inferior courts established by Congress.171 Taney also 
determined that “[e]very court of the United States . . . must derive its jurisdiction and 
judicial authority from the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”172 
Concluding that prize cases could only be adjudicated in the federal courts, Taney 
distinguished military prize courts from other military tribunals. 
The courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the war by the 
commanders of the American forces, were nothing more than the agents of 
the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory, 
and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was 
occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the military power, 
and their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding officer 
thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and 
had no right to adjudicate upon a question of prize or no prize. And the 
sentence of condemnation in the court at Monterey is a nullity, and can have 
no effect upon the rights of any party.173 
In other words, Taney concluded that military tribunals have no authority to adjudicate 
matters within the jurisdiction of our national courts. In this case, the Constitution’s 
allocation of admiralty (and thereby prize) questions to Article III courts imposed an 
applicable limit on the scope of permissible military war measures. When consistent 
with international and domestic laws governing war,174 however, military commissions 
 
46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5 (2005) (describing origins and use of military commissions in various conflicts throughout 
U.S. history). 
168. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498 (1851). 
169. See 2 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra note 68, at 831–34 (discussing use of military 
commissions to try common crimes and councils of war to try violations of laws of war). 
170. Jecker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 515. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. (emphasis added). 
174. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 627–34 (2006) (concluding that military commissions 
ordered by President failed to comply with Article 21 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 821 
(2006), because they were not tribunals permitted by the law of war, as required under that section); In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946) (“Congress gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any use of the 
military commission contemplated by the common law of war.”); see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 
342–43 (1952) (upholding jurisdiction of a military commission to convict a U.S. citizen civilian accused of 
murdering her military husband in occupied Germany). 
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have been upheld as valid war measures that do not exercise Article III judicial 
power.175 
Supreme Court case law during the Mexican War is consistent with this 
understanding of the broad nature of the Commander-in-Chief’s implied powers. In 
Cross v. Harrison,176 the Court upheld the imposition of a port tax at San Francisco by 
U.S. military authorities occupying “all of Upper California” after defeating the 
Mexican government there.177 It found the tax to be within the belligerent rights of a 
conqueror and authorized by the “constitutional commander-in-chief” even though 
Congress had “had not passed an act to extend the collection of tonnage and import 
duties to the ports of California.”178 In other words, until Congress established U.S. 
authority over occupied territory, the Commander-in-Chief’s powers were informed 
and limited by relevant international law and not the Constitution’s allocation of the 
governmental power being exercised. For this reason, the Court also upheld occupation 
laws and military courts in New Mexico until “revoked or modified . . . either by direct 
legislation on the part of Congress, or by that of the Territorial Government in the 
exercise of powers delegated by Congress,” as the power to do so was consistent with 
the applicable law of nations.179 Thus, the principle of broad presidential discretion 
informed and limited by applicable domestic or international law seems to have been 
well established by the time of the U.S. Civil War. 
B. The Articulation of Military Necessity 
The Lieber Code, adopted by President Lincoln as General Orders 100 during the 
Civil War, explicitly articulated “military necessity” as a concept of discretionary, 
implied powers.180 Drafted by Professor Francis Lieber along with other military 
experts, the Lieber Code explained the scope of military necessity in three articles: 
Art. 14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, 
consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for 
securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern 
law and usages of war. 
 
175. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8 (finding that “military tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by the 
Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made subject to review by this Court”); Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (finding that military commissions “are not courts in the sense of the 
Judiciary Article”). A full exposition of the legal theory underlying the constitutional status and governing law 
of military commissions is beyond the scope of this Article. Compare FISHER, supra note 5 (recounting and 
critiquing evolution and use of military commissions/tribunals, primarily from separation of powers 
perspective), and Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that, although not unconstitutional in every circumstance, 
establishment of military tribunals for the trial of terrorists by presidential order is “flatly unconstitutional”), 
with John M. Bickers, Military Commissions Are Constitutionally Sound: A Response to Professors Katyal and 
Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 899 (2003) (arguing that “military commission is a quasi-judicial tribunal that a 
military commander can use to make legal determinations in a martial law setting, to function as a court in an 
occupation military government, or to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused as a war criminal”). 
176. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853). 
177. Cross, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 189–90. 
178. Id. 
179. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177–78 (1857). 
180. Lieber Code, supra note 31, arts. 14–16. 
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Art. 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of 
armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally 
unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of 
every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile 
government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of 
property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or 
communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from 
the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy’s country affords 
necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such deception 
as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, 
regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the 
modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in 
public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to 
one another and to God. 
  
Art. 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of 
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not 
admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a 
district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, 
military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the 
return to peace unnecessarily difficult.181 
These broad outlines of military necessity were largely incorporated in the 
customary and conventional international laws governing war. The 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions adopted the principle that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”182 They then listed conduct specifically 
prohibited in war,183 including a declaration that it is especially prohibited “[t]o destroy 
or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war.”184 Although the United States is only a signatory 
and not a party, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions repeatedly refers to 
the concepts of necessity and military necessity as both enabling and limiting 
principles.185 Indeed, military necessity is one of the fundamental principles upon 
which the United States military structures its understanding of the laws of war.186 
 
181. Id. These articles are still cited by modern international humanitarian law scholars. THE HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 35 (Dieter Fleck, ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN 
HANDBOOK]. 
182. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, 2301 (Fourth Hague Convention). 
183. Id. arts. 23–28, at 2301–03. 
184. Id. arts. 23(g), at 2302. 
185. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, arts. 14(3)(b), 34(4)(b), 54(5), 62(1), 63(5)(b), 67(4), 
70(3)(c), 71(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
186. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, paras. 3, 16, 207, 234, 315, 350, 502 
(1956) (discussing concept of military necessity as both an enabling and limiting principle); INT’L & 
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, 
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The basic concept of military necessity as consisting of “those measures which are 
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the 
modern law and usages of war”187 appears to accurately describe the Supreme Court’s 
traditional understanding of the President’s power to conduct war. The early cases, 
particularly Marshall’s opinions in Talbot and Charming Betsy, as well as Story’s 
dissenting opinion in Brown, adopted the notion that the congressional authorization to 
conduct armed hostilities actuates both the powers and limits of applicable international 
laws—limits that could only be expanded by express authority from Congress.188 
Clearly, the laws of war and acts of Congress did not and could not regulate every 
detail of war. However, it is equally clear that where they did, those regulations 
restricted the permissible scope of the President’s military discretion. Fleming and 
Jecker also clarify that the limits of permissible military measures include any 
applicable law of nations and relevant provisions of the Constitution,189 while at the 
same time recognizing the breadth of discretion that remains. 
C. Examining the Breadth and Limits of Military Necessity 
1. The Civil War 
The Civil War brought the concept of military necessity sharply into focus. 
Fighting a war on the soil of the United States required examination of the permissible 
scope of military measures in the constitutional order. The seminal cases in which the 
Supreme Court addressed the scope of military necessity are the Prize Cases190 and Ex 
parte Milligan.191 These cases generally adhered to the concept as it had been 
articulated in earlier opinions,192 but further clarified the constitutional rights of enemy 
nationals and suspected enemy sympathizers. 
 
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 12–13 (2008) (discussing military necessity as first principle upon which law 
of war rests). 
187. Lieber Code, supra note 31, art. 14. 
188. But see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 2091–2100 (arguing that international humanitarian 
law informs the military powers granted by AUMF and “can inform the boundaries of such powers,” but that 
AUMF cannot be interpreted as imposing prohibitions of international law on the Executive). Unfortunately, 
Bradley and Goldsmith do not articulate a meaningful legal distinction between the intrinsic boundaries of 
affirmative war powers and independent prohibitions on such powers. For example, presumably they would 
support the notion that the President may detain enemy fighters at least until the close of hostilities, as is 
generally accepted in relevant international law. In such a case, international law “informs” the nature and 
boundaries of the power. However, it is doubtful that Bradley and Goldsmith would accept the position that 
independent international prohibitions applicable to such detention—such as those proscribing torture or cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment—impose any limit on the President’s implied detention power. If relevant 
international law informs the nature of an implied power, it is unclear why it would not also delimit it. 
189. Taney never touched on the applicability of the Bill of Rights, an issue prominent in current debates 
regarding the classification, detention, and trial of those detained in the post-9/11 conflict. This Article does 
not attempt to resolve all such questions, but contains further discussion of this relationship infra Part IV.C.2. 
190. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
191. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).  
192. See supra Part III for a discussion of these earlier decisions. 
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In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court considered the legality of a blockade 
unilaterally instituted by President Lincoln after the attack on Fort Sumter.193 Both the 
blockade and the subsequent seizure of ships occurred before any express 
congressional authority to conduct a war against seceding states existed. In the course 
of determining that the blockade was legally valid,194 the Court addressed the scope of 
military measures the President may adopt in response to armed attacks on the nation. 
The Court began by concluding that civil wars were governed by international 
laws of war, including laws related to blockade and prize capture.195 It next clarified 
that the President “has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign 
nation or a domestic State.”196 It nevertheless found that “by the Acts . . . of February 
28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807,” the President was “authorized to call[ ] out the 
militia and use the military and naval forces . . . in case of invasion by foreign nations, 
and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United 
States.”197 
Related to these statutory grants of authority, the Court declared: 
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander in-chief, in 
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and 
a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to 
them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and 
this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political 
department of the Government to which this power was entrusted.198 
Thus, the Court implied the scope of the President’s authority to respond to a military 
attack from acts of Congress.199 It implied the discretion to determine the nature of 
conflict and the permissible military responses not from the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause alone, but from a grant of congressional authority and from international law.200 
 
193. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 640–42. 
194I Id. at 671. 
195. Id. at 667–68 (concluding that, “[w]hen the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, 
rebellion, or insurrection, so that the Courts of Justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists and hostilities may 
be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the Government were foreign enemies invading the 
land”); see also The Venice, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 258, 274 (1864) (“The rule which declares that war makes all 
the citizens or subjects of one belligerent enemies of the Government and of all the citizens or subjects of the 
other, applies equally to civil and to international wars.” citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666, 687–88 
(Nelson, J., dissenting)). 
196. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668 (emphasis added). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 670 (emphasis added). 
199. While at the Justice Department, Professor Yoo divorced this language from its context and 
paraphrased it to justify his assertion that “[t]he President’s complete discretion in exercising the Commander-
in-Chief power has also been recognized by the courts.” Yoo Memo, supra note 33, at 5 (emphasis added). 
200. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 669–70. But see Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story 
of the Prize Cases: Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 75 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (arguing that statutes referenced by the Court were 
“inapposite to the armed force at issue in the Prize Cases” but “presumably supplied a statutory basis for 
Lincoln’s call-up of land and naval forces to apply armed force[] against active rebels”). With due respect to 
Professors Ramsey and Lee, the logic of their position is quite tenuous. Even in their extensive description of 
the history of the case, the “call-up” itself was not placed in issue by the arguments of either party. 
Additionally, the statutes referenced by the Court were not limited solely to the 1795 act giving the President 
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The Court then concluded that the property of citizens of the states in rebellion 
was properly deemed “enemy property” subject to capture under international laws 
governing war while indicating that usual constitutional protections were inapplicable 
given their enemy status.201 It then applied international laws regulating blockade and 
prize capture to determine the rights of the parties concerning captured vessels and 
property.202 Thus, the Court again recognized that the breadth of the President’s 
military discretion was subject to limits imposed by applicable domestic and 
international law.203 
Justice Nelson’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Taney and two others, differed 
from the majority on one significant detail. Justice Nelson believed that Congress had 
empowered the President to respond to an invasion, insurrection, or rebellion only 
under existing domestic (“municipal”) law rather than international laws of war unless 
or until Congress activated the war powers of the government.204 Regarding the use of 
the military under these acts, he wrote: “The whole military and naval power of the 
country is put under the control of the President to meet the emergency. He may call 
out a force in proportion to its necessities, one regiment or fifty, one ship-of-war or any 
number at his discretion.”205 The important caveat was that whatever numbers were 
used “the nature of the power is the same. It is the exercise of a power under the 
municipal laws of the country and not under the law of nations” until action by 
“Congress, who can, if it be deemed necessary, bring into operation the war power, and 
thus change the nature and character of the contest.”206 
 
power to call forth the militia, but also included the 1807 act to suppress insurrections. It is therefore odd for 
them to suggest that the Court did not intend to support the resolution of the actual issues in the case—the 
validity of the President’s unilateral resort to the war powers of blockade and prize capture—by reference to 
these statutes. In dissent, Justice Nelson appeared to agree with the interpretation here proffered regarding the 
importance of these statutes to the majority’s reasoning. See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text for 
Judge Nelson’s discussion of the distinction between the authority to respond to acts of war under municipal 
law and the authority to respond under the laws of nations. 
Also important, the Court’s opinion regarding presidential discretion bears a striking resemblance to an earlier 
decision (not cited by the court) discussing the 1795 Act and a presidential determination of the existence of 
armed conflict. 
The power itself is confided to the Executive of the Union . . . who is, by the constitution, “the 
commander in chief of the militia, when called into the actual service of the United States,” whose 
duty it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” . . . . He is necessarily constituted the 
judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according to his belief 
of the facts. . . . Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by 
him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute 
constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts. 
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31–32 (1827) (emphasis added). 
201. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 671–74. 
202. Id. at 674–82. 
203. Id. at 669–70. C.f. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 200, at 89 (arguing that majority opinion “seemed to 
assume—for reasons not entirely articulated—that captures not conforming to international law would not be 
valid”). 
204. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 693 (Nelson, J. dissenting). 
205. Id. at 692. 
206. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In Nelson’s opinion, this congressional act was needed to ensure that “instead of 
being carried on under the municipal law of 1795,” the exercise of military power 
“would be under the law of nations, and the Acts of Congress as war measures with all 
the rights of war.”207 Without such clear authorization from Congress to engage the 
threat with war powers, Justice Nelson felt the majority had erred in finding the acts of 
the President to rest in international laws of war rather than domestic law.208 Indeed, he 
indicated that even the President had made no such claim.209 
While there is a fundamental disagreement on the sources of law applicable to the 
President’s actions prior to congressional action, the level of agreement between these 
opinions is also important. Both the majority and dissenting opinions endorsed the view 
that, pursuant to appropriate acts of Congress, an invasion or significant rebellion, 
coupled with congressional authority, impliedly vests the President with the power to 
respond with the military measures he deems necessary to counter the attack.210 Their 
disagreement related only to whether he could resort to war powers under international 
law—with their attendant effects on the private rights of citizens of seceding states and 
on the rights and interests of other nations and their nationals—without a declaration of 
war from Congress.211 Both opinions also appeared to agree that international laws 
regulating blockade and captured property would apply if the resort to war powers was 
appropriate.212 
While the Prize Cases addressed military necessity with regard to the powers of 
war against seceding “enemy” states and their citizens, Ex parte Milligan focused on 
the permissible scope of military necessity in Indiana, a loyal state facing a general 
threat of invasion.213 Lambdin P. Milligan, a citizen of the United States and twenty-
year resident of the State of Indiana, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the 
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana “to be discharged from an 
 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 693 (“The Acts of 1795 and 1807 did not, and could not under the Constitution, confer on the 
President the power of declaring war against a State of this Union, or of deciding that war existed, and upon 
that ground authorize the capture and confiscation of the property of every citizen of the State whenever it was 
found on the waters.”). 
209. Id. at 686 (“It is remarkable, also, that both the President and the Secretary, in referring to the 
blockade, treat the measure, not as a blockade under the law of nations, but as a restraint upon commerce at the 
interdicted ports under the municipal laws of the Government.”). 
210. Nelson cited Brown v. United States, which is discussed supra Part III for the proposition that 
congressional power was required to call into force the powers of war. Id. at 687–88 (Nelson, J. dissenting). 
211. Justice Nelson viewed the war as “personal” in nature until Congress acted. He believed that 
the war carried on by the President against the insurrectionary districts in the Southern States, as in 
the case of the King of Great Britain in the American Revolution, was a personal war against those 
in rebellion, and with encouragement and support of loyal citizens with a view to their co-operation 
and aid in suppressing the insurgents, with this difference, as the war-making power belonged to the 
King, he might have recognized or declared the war at the beginning to be a civil war which would 
draw after it all the rights of a belligerent, but in the case of the President no such power existed: the 
war therefore from necessity was a personal war, until Congress assembled and acted upon this state 
of things. 
Id. at 694–95. This raises interesting and alarming questions regarding the scope of the President’s powers to 
conduct such domestic, “personal” wars against insurrections. 
212. But see Lee & Ramsey, supra note 200, at 88–89. 
213. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6–7 (1866). 
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alleged unlawful imprisonment.”214 Although he had never served in the army or navy, 
Milligan had been arrested from his home in October of 1864 and was tried before a 
military commission.215 Both events were by order of General Hovey, the commander 
of the military district of Indiana.216 Milligan was found guilty and sentenced to be 
hanged.217 
At the Supreme Court, the question presented was whether Milligan was properly 
subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission even though Congress had 
directed that those so situated be delivered to the local federal district court.218 The 
Court began by rejecting the notion that: 
In a time of war the commander of an armed force (if in his opinion the 
exigencies of the country demand it, and of which he is to judge), has the 
power, within the lines of his military district, to suspend all civil rights and 
their remedies, and subject citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of his will; 
and in the exercise of his lawful authority cannot be restrained, except by his 
superior officer or the President of the United States.219 
Instead, the Court focused on what military measures could be adopted in an area 
where it found “the Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always 
open to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances.”220 
Importantly, the Court emphasized that the case did not involve “a question of the 
power to proclaim martial law, when war exists in a community and the courts and civil 
authorities are overthrown.”221 Nor did the Court believe it involved “a question [of] 
what rule a military commander, at the head of his army, can impose on states in 
rebellion to cripple their resources and quell the insurrection.”222 In other words, the 
Court clarified that this was not a typical case of simple military necessity. 
Instead, the Court concluded that “[m]artial law cannot arise from a threatened 
invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion . . . effectually closes 
the courts and deposes the civil administration.”223 The Court noted that Milligan 
 
214. Id. at 107. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 121. 
219. Id. at 124. 
220. Id. at 121. 
221. Id. at 126. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 127. Justice Field expressed a similar opinion regarding the nature of military jurisdiction 
over civilians in a later case: 
It may be true, also, that on the actual theatre of military operations what is termed martial law, but 
which would be better called martial rule, for it is little else than the will of the commanding 
general, applies to all persons, whether in the military service or civilians. It may be true that no 
one, whatever his station or occupation, can there interfere with or obstruct any of the measures 
deemed essential for the success of the army, without subjecting himself to immediate arrest and 
summary punishment. The ordinary laws of the land are there superseded by the laws of war. The 
jurisdiction of the civil magistrate is there suspended, and military authority and force are 
substituted. The success of the army is the controlling consideration, and to that every thing else is 
required to bend. 
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should have been delivered to the local federal court as required by Congress224 and 
that not even Congress could have authorized trial by military commission under the 
circumstances.225 In essence, the Court determined that the perceived necessities of war 
could not generally displace or supersede applicable domestic law, at least not in 
territory still under the control of the government, so long as civil authorities remained 
available to enforce it. 
Concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Chase focused on the statutory 
requirements and separation of powers issues. In spite of commentary indicating 
otherwise, his opinion endorsed a concept of military necessity consisting of implied 
powers authorized by Congress, not of inherent, plenary presidential authority. 226 
Chase began his analysis by concluding that “Milligan was imprisoned under the 
authority of the President, and was not a prisoner of war.”227 He noted that “[n]o list of 
prisoners had been furnished to the judges, either of the District or Circuit Courts, as 
required by [an applicable act of Congress].”228 He further noted that “[a] grand jury 
had attended the Circuit Courts of the Indiana district, while Milligan was there 
imprisoned, and had closed its session without finding any indictment or presentment 
or otherwise proceeding against the prisoner.”229 Therefore, Chase found that 
Milligan’s “case was thus brought within the precise letter and intent of the act of 
Congress.”230 It was this failure to comply with an applicable act of Congress that 
caused Chase to agree with the majority on the need to issue the writ of habeas 
corpus.231 Importantly, Chase thereby agreed that the law enacted by Congress 
 
Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 293 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting). 
224. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 122. The importance of this statute to the majority’s reasoning is 
debatable given the majority’s reliance on a “closed courts” standard for the abrogation of Article III 
jurisdiction and Bill of Rights protections. 
225. Id. at 121–22. 
226. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman II, supra note 15, at 1018–19 (characterizing Chase’s opinion as 
“first judicial expression of the theory of the substantive Commander in Chief preclusive power that is now the 
centerpiece of the Department of Justice’s defense of the Bush Administration’s views”). Barron and 
Lederman collected numerous scholarly works that have interpreted Chase’s opinion in a similar manner. Id. at 
1019 n.307. 
227. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 134 (Chase, C.J., concurring). 
228. Id. More fully, Chase was referring to the Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, the second section of 
which: 
required that lists of all persons, being citizens of states in which the administration of the laws had 
continued unimpaired in the Federal courts, who were then held or might thereafter be held as 
prisoners of the United States, under the authority of the President, otherwise than as prisoners of 
war, should be furnished to the judges of the Circuit and District Courts. . . . And it was required, in 
cases where the grand jury in attendance upon any of these courts should terminate its session 
without proceeding by indictment or otherwise against any prisoner named in the list, that the judge 
of the court should forthwith make an order that such prisoner. . . be discharged, on entering into 
recognizance, if required, to keep the peace and for good behavior, or to appear, as the court might 
direct, to be further dealt with according to law. 
Id. at 133. 
229. Id. at 134. 
230. Id. 
231. See id. at 135–36 (arguing that it is unnecessary to look beyond directions of Congress). 
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governed General Hovey’s actions even though he assumed Hovey to be acting on the 
authority of the President.232 
Chase’s disagreement with the majority related only to whether Congress could 
authorize the military tribunals at issue, and for that reason indemnify the officers who 
convened and composed them from potential individual liability.233 It was in this 
narrow context that Chase provided the following analysis: 
 Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies 
but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying 
on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the 
prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the 
command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty 
belong to the President as commander-in-chief. Both these powers are 
derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. 
Their extent must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our 
institutions. 
 The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to 
execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and auxiliary 
powers. Each includes all authorities essential to its due exercise. But neither 
can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper 
authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the 
President. Both are servants of the people, whose will is expressed in the 
fundamental law. Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can 
the President, or any commander under him, without the sanction of 
Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences, either 
of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a controlling necessity, which 
justifies what it compels, or at least insures acts of indemnity from the justice 
of the legislature.234 
Chase concluded with the view that “it is within the power of Congress to determine in 
what states or districts such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies the 
authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the 
discipline or security of the army or against the public safety.”235 
The precise meaning of Chase’s statements regarding the relative war powers of 
Congress and the President is somewhat debatable. Placed in the full context of his 
opinion, however, Chase does not appear to have supported preclusive presidential 
authority over the conduct of war. His opinion more readily supports a much narrower 
view of presidential power as one of implied powers to direct the employment of 
military forces, subject to applicable laws. Chase’s acknowledgement of Congress’s 
powers to “provide by law for carrying on war” and to enact “all legislation essential to 
the prosecution of war with vigor and success”236 appears to recognize a substantial 
role for Congress in both initiating and regulating war. If so, Chase’s reference to 
 
232. Id. at 134. 
233. Id. at 136. 
234. Id. at 139–40. 
235. Id. at 140 (emphasis added). 
236. Id. at 139 (emphasis added). 
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Congress’s inability to “interfere[] with the command of the forces”237 means only that 
Congress could not affirmatively direct the precise employment or series of actions 
military units might take to defeat an enemy, not to a plenary presidential power of 
expediency. Likewise, Chase’s reference to Congress’s inability to “direct the conduct 
of campaigns”238 would not preclude general regulation of the objects, means, or 
methods of those campaigns, as the earlier aspects of his opinion clearly indicated. Any 
broader reading of these phrases would be at odds with his reference to Congress’s 
broad powers to legislate for the “prosecution” of war. 
Chase’s later reference to the need for legislative indemnification of certain 
Presidential actions absent “controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels,”239 
unmistakably indicates that Chase believed Congress has a significant role in regulating 
executive actions in war. Why would it be necessary for Congress to indemnify acts 
constitutionally vested to the President’s discretion? 
Fairly read, Chase appears to have understood the Commander-in-Chief power to 
be one of express and implied powers conferred by Congress to conduct war. He 
simply found that a statute dictated an action other than what General Hovey ordered. 
His view that Congress could have authorized Milligan’s military tribunal based on its 
finding an imminent public danger, as well as his conclusion that Milligan’s habeas 
writ must issue for failure to comply with an act of Congress, substantially undermines 
the notion that he was asserting the existence of preclusive Commander-in-Chief 
powers. He did, however, create confusion regarding the scope of the President’s 
implied powers with his reference to “cases of a controlling necessity, which justifies 
what it compels, or at least insures acts of indemnity from the justice of the 
legislature.”240 A related line of precedent sheds light on this reference. 
2. Abrogating Rights in War—Notions of Public Necessity 
The Milligan majority and concurring opinions both conclude that individual 
rights, including constitutional rights unavailable at trial by military commission, may 
be abrogated in armed conflict. They merely disagreed on the conditions that permit it. 
Both opinions appear to have suggested that the standard varies depending on the 
location and circumstances, with the majority requiring a demonstrable factual or 
imperative necessity and Chase endorsing greater legislative discretion. 
A general notion of an overriding public necessity in armed conflict seems logical 
enough given that the Constitution expressly preserved this possibility with regard to 
the writ of habeas corpus. Recall that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”241 Thus, even this fundamental individual privilege may yield to the 
imperative necessities of war. 
 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 140. 
240. Id. 
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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The notion of a public necessity in war is also logical given that armed conflict 
results in both intended and unavoidable, incidental loss of life and property, as 
indicated by Article 15 of the Lieber Code.242 This concept is preserved in modern 
international humanitarian law. Prohibited attacks include those “which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.”243 In other words, the laws of war embrace a 
utilitarian principle: that some innocent civilian lives may be taken, some property 
destroyed, when not excessive to the military advantage to be gained. 
The Supreme Court has accepted this concept in principle, though its application 
has sometimes varied. In Mitchell v. Harmony,244 the Supreme Court considered 
whether a military commander could destroy the property of a U.S. merchant who had 
accompanied the military unit to Mexico.245 The commander did so ostensibly to 
prevent the merchant’s property from falling into enemy hands.246 The Court upheld a 
jury verdict against the officer for the loss of the merchant’s property.247 It found that 
the instruction to the jury regarding the exigent circumstances required to justify the 
commander’s actions accurately reflected the law and that—through its verdict—the 
jury found the standard was not met.248 Although the commander had argued for a 
measure of deference to his judgment in a distant theater of war, the Court concluded: 
 There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may 
lawfully be taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from falling into 
the hands of the public enemy; and also where a military officer, charged 
with a particular duty, may impress private property into the public service 
or take it for public use. Unquestionably, in such cases, the government is 
bound to make full compensation to the owner; but the officer is not a 
trespasser. 
 But we are clearly of opinion, that in all of these cases the danger must be 
immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the public service, 
such as will not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil authority 
would be too late in providing the means which the occasion calls for. It is 
impossible to define the particular circumstances of danger or necessity in 
which this power may be lawfully exercised. Every case must depend on its 
own circumstances. It is the emergency that gives the right, and the 
emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.249 
Here, the Court plainly clarifies that private rights of even loyal U.S. nationals may be 
abridged when required by an imperative necessity of war. Commanders faced with 
dire circumstances may take and use, or destroy and thereby deny enemy access to, 
private property. Although the extant necessity permits such action without Fifth 
 
242. Lieber Code, supra note 31, arts. 14–16, at 6 
243. Protocol I, supra note 182, art. 51(5)(b), at 26 (emphasis added). 
244. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851). 
245. Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 133. 
246. Id. at 117. 
247. Id. at 137. 
248. Id. at 133–35. 
249. Id. at 134. 
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Amendment due process, it does not relieve the government of Just Compensation 
Clause requirements. Thus, only rights that must give way under the circumstances 
may be abrogated. Although the standard to justify such action appears to be quite high, 
it is not unattainable. 
In United States v. Russell,250 which arose during the Civil War, the military 
commandeered privately-owned steamboats to support military operations, 
“impress[ing] private property into the public service”251 just as the Mitchell Court had 
suggested.252 The Supreme Court found that 
a taking of private property by the government, when the emergency of the 
public service in time of war or impending public danger is too urgent to 
admit of delay, is everywhere regarded as justified, if the necessity for the 
use of the property is imperative and immediate, and the danger, as 
heretofore described, is impending . . . [I]t is equally clear that the taking of 
such property under such circumstances creates an obligation on the part of 
the government to reimburse the owner to the full value of the service. 
Private rights, under such extreme and imperious circumstances, must give 
way for the time to the public good, but the government must make full 
restitution for the sacrifice.253 
The approaches in these cases clearly reflect the common law tort doctrine of 
public necessity. A public officer may invade private property interests, but only when 
urgently necessary for the public good.254 As Milligan makes clear, the rights which 
might properly be infringed are not limited to property interests, but also include 
constitutional rights unenforceable when the courts are closed. Logically then, the 
application of such a concept to battlefield conduct both adds to and further delimits the 
President’s Commander-in-Chief authority. 
It is also important to note that such imperative public necessity appears to be 
required only in cases involving the rights of U.S. citizens not classified as an enemy. 
In Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,255 the Supreme Court determined that the 
government need not compensate for the destruction of the property of an American 
business operating in enemy territory and (apparently) supporting that enemy’s war 
effort. 256 The Court did not conduct a public necessity analysis. It found that, under 
these circumstances, the American company’s property constituted enemy property 
 
250. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871). 
251. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 628–29. 
252. Id. at 629 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 134). 
253. Id. 
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196, cmt. b (1965). Note that the Restatement provides that: 
A privilege similar to that stated in this Section has been recognized in older cases, where members 
of the military forces have acted to occupy, remove, or destroy property for the purpose of 
protection against a public enemy. Such action, in the exercise of special military power or authority 
in time of war or of martial law, lies beyond the scope of the ordinary law of Torts, and is therefore 
beyond the scope of this Restatement. 
Id. cmt. i; see also Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 363 (Pa. 1788) (finding Continental Congress 
had authority to remove and store barrels of flour to prevent their capture by enemy and was not required to 
provide compensation when those barrels were later captured). 
255. 212 U.S. 297 (1909).  
256. Juragua Iron, 212 U.S. at 297, 302, 311.  
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lawfully subject to capture or destruction in war. 257 Juragua Iron, like the Prize Cases 
and others, 258 supports the general proposition that those properly considered public 
enemies, whether citizens or foreign nationals, may not claim the protections of the Bill 
of Rights against a proper use of war or military occupation powers. An enemy’s rights 
are governed only by the laws of war and military necessity rather than by requirements 
for an imperative public necessity justifying the abrogation of otherwise applicable 
constitutional rights.259 
The first Supreme Court decision adopting “military necessity” as a descriptive 
legal term was the Civil War case of United States v. Pacific Railroad.260 The Court 
considered whether the government could charge railroad companies for the 
reconstruction of railroad bridges on the companies’ property in Missouri.261 The 
government had earlier destroyed the bridges to prevent the advance of Confederate 
troops and later rebuilt them after reestablishing their defenses.262 The local 
commander deemed both actions to be matters of urgent military necessity.263 Not 
surprisingly, the Court concluded that “[m]ilitary necessity will justify the destruction 
of property, but will not compel private parties to erect on their own lands works 
needed by the government, or to pay for such works when erected by the 
government.”264 Thus, the Court again recognized the proposition that the public 
necessity component of military necessity may justify abrogating private property 
rights in an active theater of war. 
3. The Second World War 
The Second World War presented the greatest threat of full-scale conventional 
war that the continental United States has faced in the last century. It is not surprising, 
then, that the concept of military necessity again became an important, if more 
controversial, part of our constitutional tradition at that time. 
The Supreme Court referred to military necessity when upholding a curfew order 
imposed against Japanese Americans in certain West Coast areas in Hirabayashi v. 
 
257. Id. at 309–11; see also Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 170 (1879) (directing verdict in favor of a 
brigadier general in damages action against him for private property seized in Louisiana on grounds that 
Louisiana was enemy property under military occupation and the property had been seized for military 
maintenance). 
258. See, e.g., The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129 (1869) (upholding the jurisdiction of presidentially 
established courts in occupied Louisiana until replaced by Congress after the close of hostilities); The Venice, 
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 258 (1864) (addressing property rights of citizens of formerly rebellious state once military 
order was established). 
259. Professor Monaghan asserts that “[a]s [Youngstown] makes plain, executive officials ordinarily 
must point to the presence of legislative authority, not to its absence, to justify conduct that burdens private 
rights.” Monaghan, supra note 17, at 39. While this may be the ordinary case, clear exceptions for military 
necessity in a theater of war and the less than clear exception for martial law where the operation of 
government has been disrupted appear to exist in both domestic and international law. It is the scope and limits 
to those exceptions that are at issue generally in armed conflict, particularly in the post-9/11 conflict. 
260. 120 U.S. 227 (1887). 
261. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 229. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 239. 
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United States.265 It also upheld the exclusion of Japanese Americans from certain parts 
of the West Coast in Korematsu v. United States.266 Both orders were sustained based 
upon the existence of broad congressional and executive authorization coupled with a 
military commander’s determination of their local necessity.267 Although both 
decisions are rightly criticized because of their failure to address the readily apparent 
discrimination which motivated the categorical application of these measures to those 
of Japanese ancestry,268 the need for some military action based on the perceived threat 
was at least arguable.269 
Given that these cases involved substantial rights of U.S. citizens in U.S. territory, 
they are most properly viewed as an erroneous application of the public necessity 
component of military necessity. The Court noted that “the properly constituted 
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take 
proper security measures.”270 According to the Court, “[t]here was evidence of 
disloyalty on the part of some” and “military authorities considered that the need for 
action was great, and time was short.”271 The Court was thus much more deferential to 
military determinations regarding the proper application and scope of emergency 
measures than it had been in Mitchell and Russell. It simply failed to require clear proof 
of an imperative necessity and the narrow responsive measures that it had earlier 
required to abrogate the rights of loyal U.S. citizens. 
Different considerations underlie the Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin.272 In 
Quirin, the Court upheld the President’s order to try Nazi saboteurs—including a 
putative U.S. citizen—by military commission in the United States even though civil 
courts were open.273 Distinguishing Milligan, the court found that these commissions 
were consistent with relevant international law and specifically authorized by Congress 
in the Articles of War.274 For these reasons, the Court did not require compliance with 
 
265. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
266. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
267. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 103–04; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217–18. 
268. But see Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (“Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case 
involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice . . . . To cast 
this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, 
merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or 
his race.”). 
269. It has been noted that at the time of the order at issue in Korematsu, the government asserted that 
“the Japanese Navy was regularly sinking ships off the west coast and firing upon land facilities in California 
and Oregon, and there was intelligence information suggesting that a Japanese invasion of the west coast was 
imminent, and was being facilitated by Japanese-Americans in the United States.” CURTIS A. BRADLEY & 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 266 (2003) (citing U.S DEP’T OF WAR, FINAL REPORT: 
JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 1942 (1978)). But see David G. Savage, U.S. Official Cites 
Official Misconduct in Japanese American Internment Cases, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2011, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-japanese-americans-20110525,0,3517138.story 
(reporting that government attorneys “deliberately hid from the court a report from the Office of Naval 
Intelligence that concluded the Japanese Americans on the West Coast did not pose a military threat”). 
270. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24. 
271. Id. 
272.  317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
273. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18–24, 48. 
274. Id. at 28–29. According to the Court, 
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Milligan’s “closed courts”—or one might say “imperative necessity”—standard. It 
implicitly found, as it had in the Prize Cases and Juragua Iron, that only the laws of 
war govern the rights of enemies in armed conflict with the United States.275 
While some commentary claims that other factors may have influenced the 
outcome in Quirin,276 the Court’s decision appears to have clearly rested on: (1) 
congressional authorization for the use of such tribunals;277 (2) the saboteurs’ 
undisputed status as enemy combatants;278 (3) the fact that military commissions and 
the punishment they imposed were believed to be consistent with international laws 
governing war;279 and (4) the lack of constitutional protections afforded a public 
enemy, whether citizen or alien, triable by military tribunal.280 In other words, the 
Court again found that simple rather than imperative military necessity supported the 
use of war measures against a clearly identified enemy in armed conflict. 
The World War II-era Supreme Court also limited some claims of military 
necessity. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku,281 the Court overturned convictions by martial 
law military tribunals in Hawaii. These tribunals had been established in the days 
following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and in accordance with the Territorial Governor’s 
 
[a]n important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command 
not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those 
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. It 
is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in 
Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional 
legislation . . . [f]or here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such 
commissions. 
Id. 
275. Id. at 31. Other Supreme Court precedent might also support treating at least some international law 
as a separate governing body of law, neither truly state nor truly federal, providing a rule of decision in 
appropriate cases in a conflicts-of-laws fashion. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545–46 
(1828) (concluding that cases in admiralty are not “cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United 
States” but nevertheless that “the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our 
Courts to the cases as they arise”). Both Francis Lieber and William Winthrop appear to have believed this to 
be true of the laws governing war. The Lieber Code provided: 
Art. 40. There exists no law or body of authoritative rules of action between hostile armies, except 
that branch of the law of nature and nations which is called the law and usage of war on land. 
Art. 41. All municipal law of the ground on which the armies stand, or of the countries to which 
they belong, is silent and of no effect between armies in the field. 
Lieber Code, supra note 31, arts. 40–41, at 9. Winthrop stated that the law governing war “prescribes the rights 
and obligations of belligerents, or—more broadly—those principles and usages which, in time of war, define 
the status and relations . . . of enemies” and then continued to further say that “the Law of War may, in its 
exercise, substantially supersede for the time even the Constitution itself.” 2 MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 
supra note 68, at 1203–04. 
276. Professor Goldsmith asserts that political realities may have had something to do with the Court’s 
decision. GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 50–52. 
277. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29. 
278. Id. at 31–38. 
279. Id. at 29–31; see also John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: 
The Common Law Origins of ‘Murder in Violation of the Law of War,’ 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63, 79–81 (2009) 
(analyzing the Quirin Court’s references to relevant international law). 
280. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38–46. 
281. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
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declaration of martial law—a declaration that had been ratified by the President.282 The 
tribunals, which convicted defendants over eight months after the attacks in one case 
and over two years later in another, were found to have exceeded both the temporal and 
substantive scope of their necessity because Hawaiian courts were open and again 
functioning.283 In Ex parte Endo,284 the Court granted relief to a Japanese-American 
woman whose forced internment was based solely on her ancestry and without 
adequate proof the she posed a threat to security.285 In other words, the Court found 
that neither simple military nor imperative public necessity justified her continued 
detention.286 
D. More Interim Observations 
The Court has adopted a calibrated approach to the necessities of war. First, it has 
embraced the concept of military necessity: a doctrine of implied powers to adopt 
military measures against enemy combatants or foreign/enemy populations that are not 
prohibited by the Constitution, an applicable statute, or international laws governing 
war. Second, it endorses the concept that military necessity encompasses a public or 
imperative necessity component that permits abrogating private, statutory, and 
constitutional rights in some exigent circumstances. The key caveat is that any such 
imperative necessity justifies abrogating only those rights that must yield under the 
circumstances. The Civil War- and World War II-era cases demonstrated the difficulty 
of balancing these simple and imperative necessities of war with individual rights 
preserved by the Constitution and at common law.287 
What emerges from this analysis is that there are three factors which determine 
the level or nature of necessity required to lawfully adopt a given war measure: (1) the 
status of the person or property—enemy, friendly (citizen), or neutral (foreign 
national), (2) the specifically applicable international and domestic law, and (3) within 
U.S. territory, generally applicable domestic law and the governing capacity of civil 
authorities. Regarding decisions to attack, detain, or try by military tribunal those 
properly considered an enemy, the President and his military commanders must comply 
only with specifically applicable international or domestic laws. They otherwise 
maintain broad discretion in the conduct of hostilities against the nation’s enemies. The 
courts have required a compelling, imperative public necessity before permitting 
invasion of private rights of loyal U.S. residents or nationals without typical 
constitutional protections. 
 
282. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 307–09. 
283. Id. at 309–10, 324. 
284. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
285. Endo, 323 U.S. at 302–04. 
286. See id. at 300–04 (finding that any detention deemed necessary to prevent espionage or sabotage 
does not extend to loyal citizens). 
287. It is also important to note that these cases stand for the general legal principles of the necessities of 
war. Statutes now delimit damage remedies against government officials and the United States for actions 
taken in war or other military operations. Foremost among these are the Foreign Claims Act (codified at 10 
U.S.C. § 2734 (2006)) and the Westfall Act (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006)). The Westfall 
Act amended the Federal Tort Claims Acts (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006)). See infra note 388 
for further discussion of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Westfall Act. 
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E. Recent Cases in the Post-9/11 Conflict 
When confronted with the post-9/11 conflict, the courts (with the exception of a 
panel of the D.C. Circuit)288 have intuitively, albeit implicitly, continued to follow this 
conceptual framework. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,289 a plurality of the Court found that the 
President could detain Hamdi—a U.S. citizen captured on a foreign battlefield and 
believed to have been a part or acting in substantial support of armed forces hostile to 
the United States.290 The plurality found that the AUMF allowed the President to 
exercise war powers, and that those powers included detention of a suspected enemy in 
a foreign theater of war even if that enemy was a U.S. citizen.291 Although Congress 
had enacted a general prohibition against detention “except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress,”292 the Court found that this most basic measure of war was impliedly 
authorized by the AUMF,293 one which either superseded or provided an exception to 
the non-detention statute. 
The plurality also found that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause entitled 
Hamdi, who contested his status as an enemy combatant, to “notice of the factual basis 
for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual 
assertions [supporting his detention] before a neutral decisionmaker.”294 In other 
words, the executive’s authority to use force implicitly included this measure of simple 
military necessity. Because of the fundamental change in the nature of rights afforded 
public enemies, however, the Court found that the Constitution required an adequate 
determination of Hamdi’s enemy status. 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld295 reflects a similar relationship between the Commander-in-
Chief’s power and applicable acts of Congress. Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was 
alleged to have been complicit in the criminal activities of al Qaeda, including being 
Osama bin Laden’s driver.296 He had been charged297 and was awaiting trial by a 
 
288. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (rejecting “premise that the war powers granted by the AUMF and other statutes are limited by the 
international laws of war” because “[t]here is no indication in the AUMF, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
. . . , or the MCA of 2006 or 2009, that Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extra-textual 
limiting principles for the President's war powers under the AUMF”). 
289. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
290. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509–13 (plurality opinion). 
291. Id. at 519 (“Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental 
incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and 
unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.”). 
292. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006). 
293. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (concluding that lack of specific language in statute is of no concern 
because Congress authorized “necessary and appropriate” measures). 
294. Id. at 533. This decision is not inconsistent with the Court’s earlier decision that Haupt, a putative 
U.S. citizen and one of the Quirin saboteurs, was an “enemy” triable by military commission because his 
status as an enemy was, for relevant purposes, undisputed. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942) 
(“Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, 
guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the 
Hague Convention and the law of war.”). 
295. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
296. See Dep’t of Defense, MC Form 458, Charge Sheet Pertaining to Salim Ahmed Hamdan 5 (Apr. 5, 
2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2007/Hamdan_Charges.pdf. 
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military commission established pursuant to a presidential order (hereinafter Military 
Commissions Order).298 He challenged the legality of the Military Commissions Order 
on several grounds. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Military Commissions Order was fatally 
defective for failure to comply with specifically applicable domestic statutes.299 First, 
the Court found insufficient justification for departures from the rules and procedures 
applicable at courts-martial, as required by Article 36(b) of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ).300 Second, the Court determined that the commissions failed 
to comply with Article 21 of the UCMJ because they were not tribunals permitted by 
the laws of war, as required by that Article.301 Based primarily on the Order’s failure to 
comply with Article 36(b), the Court found that the Order did not comply with a 
provision in Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (known as 
“Common Article 3”)302 prohibiting the “passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”303 The Court found that, at a minimum, Common Article 3 applied to the 
conflict between the United States and al Qaeda,304 and therefore was an applicable 
“law of war” with which the President was required to comply to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 21.305 
A plurality of the Hamdan Court also found that Hamdan’s military commission 
was not supported by certain elements of military necessity associated with military 
 
297. To view the original charges, see Charges Pertaining to Salim Ahmed Hamdan, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040714hcc.pdf (last visited June 13, 2011). 
298. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in 
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (2001) (authorizing detention and trial by military tribunal for 
terrorist suspects and ordering conformity of tribunals to prior law only as far as “practicable”). 
299. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622–25, 627–31. 
300. Id. at 622 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000)). The UCMJ is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 
(2006). 
301. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627–28 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000)). The Military Commissions Act of 
2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948(a)–950(w) (Supp. 2010)), 
amended this provision. Section 4(a)(2) of the MCA amended 10 U.S.C. § 821 by adding “[t]his section does 
not apply to a military commission established under chapter 47A [that is, a military commission established 
by the MCA] of this title.” Id. § 4(a)(2), at 2631. Arguably then, this was the express legislative authorization 
required by the Charming Betsy to violate the laws governing war if inconsistent with the MCA. See John C. 
Dehn, Why Article 5 Status Determinations Are Not ‘Required’ at Guantánamo, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 371, 
380–83 (2008) (arguing that this amendment and other provisions of MCA are inconsistent with relevant 
provisions of Geneva Conventions and must be applied as later-in-time domestic law). 
302. Of the four Geneva Conventions, the two most relevant to military commissions are the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW], 
and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. 
303. GPW, supra note 297, art. 3(1)(d), at 136, 138. 
304. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629–31. 
305. Id. Note also that the Court once again considered the AUMF to have activated the President’s war 
powers, including the power to convene military commissions, but did not read the AUMF or any other 
enactment as authority to ignore the requirements of Article 21 of the UCMJ. Id. at 594. 
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tribunals.306 Although the specifics of that analysis are not essential to this discussion, 
it is important to again note the Court’s express recognition of a military necessity 
concept subject to congressional acts delimiting executive discretion in war. 
Boumediene v. Bush307 provides an example of the complexity involved in 
determining the applicability of constitutional provisions to the nation’s enemies. The 
Court determined that the Suspension Clause, pertaining to the writ of habeas corpus, 
applies to putative public enemies in a functional manner.308 After noting the length of 
some of the detentions at issue and the detainees’ denial of enemy status, the court 
concluded that 
at least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension 
Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the 
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of 
the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the 
writ.309 
Putting aside the issue of whether the Court was correct to extend the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus to non-citizens detained extraterritorially,310 the factors it 
adopted are clearly based on the three factors outlined in Part IV.D above. The factors 
account for enemy status, citizenship, and location, all important to determining 
applicable international and domestic law. They also require consideration of “practical 
obstacles,” which would arguably include the availability and capacity of civil 
authorities and other factors influencing imperative necessity determinations. 
Post-Boumediene district court decisions examining the scope of the President’s 
authority to indefinitely detain individuals captured in the post-9/11 conflict have also 
followed this conceptual framework. These courts have thus far agreed that the AUMF 
authorizes the President to detain members of an armed enemy organization as 
permitted by international humanitarian law.311 Decisions regarding the types of 
individuals subject to detention have varied only slightly, essentially focusing on 
whether an individual is “part of” an enemy organization in armed conflict with the 
United States.312 In one case a court found that a detained individual could not possibly 
 
306. See id. at 597–613 (plurality opinion) (discussing historical context of military tribunals). 
307. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
308. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733. 
309. Id. at 766 (emphasis added). 
310. Even if Boumediene is correct on this point, it does not necessarily follow that individuals held as 
enemies or prosecuted for law-of-war violations must be afforded protections of the Bill of Rights. 
311. E.g., Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2009); Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. 
Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 77 (D.D.C. 2009); Gherebi v. Obama, 
609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2009). 
312. In Gherebi, the court distinguished between those who provide only indirect support to hostilities 
by a loosely-networked armed enemy organization and those who are “part of” such an organization, 
concluding “the substantial support model advanced by the government is restricted to those individuals that 
are effectively part of the [armed] force[s] of the enemy.” Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (alterations in the 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Hamlily and Mattan, the courts adopted a functionally 
equivalent standard, best represented by the Mattan court’s statement that, “the Court will adopt [the 
government’s] proposed definition except for the two ‘support’-related elements . . . . However, the Court will 
still consider support of Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated enemy forces in determining whether a detainee 
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be considered “part of” the Taliban or al Qaeda forces or otherwise within the scope of 
the AUMF.313 These courts have also derived the scope and limits of the Commander-
in-Chief’s detention authority from their view of the applicable (or analogous) 
international laws of war and the AUMF.314 
F. Clarifying the Confusion Regarding the Commander-in-Chief’s Authority in War 
The confusion regarding the President’s Commander-in-Chief power stems in 
large part from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of military command. 
While military commanders possess broad and inherent directive authority, the above 
analysis makes clear that the scope of that authority is always implied and subordinate 
rather than plenary and independent. The sheer breadth of matters to which a military 
commander’s implied authority extends is sometimes mistaken for virtually unlimited 
power.315 
This fundamental misunderstanding results in confusion regarding what it means 
to “direct the conduct of military campaigns” and similar phrases describing command 
authority in the case law.316 If Congress could not “interfere with the command” of the 
military or with the “conduct of campaigns” in the broadest possible sense of such 
phrases, its powers over war and to make rules for the government and regulation of the 
armed forces would be a nullity. Such an understanding is not supportable textually, 
 
should be considered ‘part of’ those forces.” Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26; see also Anam v. Obama, 653 F. 
Supp. 2d 62, 64 & n.2 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding Hamlily “not inconsistent” with Gherebi, describing the 
differences to be “of form rather than substance”). For a broader review and analysis of post-Boumediene 
habeas decisions, see generally WITTES ET AL., supra note 3. 
313. Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 129–30. 
314. But see supra note 7 for a discussion of Al-Bhiani and whether international law is relevant to the 
inquiry. 
315. An example is Professors Barron and Lederman’s belief that there exists a general “preclusive 
prerogative of superintendence” in the Commander-in-Chief power. Barron & Lederman II, supra note 15, at 
1040. To the extent that this implies Congress—despite its broad powers of government and regulation— 
cannot regulate anything within its purview, Barron and Lederman are, with respect, in error. They appear to 
confuse the extremely broad nature of military matters subject to command discretion with a plenary authority 
to exercise that discretion. While the impracticability of Congress’s regulating the minutia of day-to-day 
military matters leaves broad discretion to the President and his subordinate military commanders, it cannot be 
said that there thereby exists a preclusive power in law, though one might exist to some extent in practice. One 
wonders how much of Title 10 of the United States Code (governing the armed forces) Barron and Lederman 
might find to be incompatible with this alleged prerogative. Interestingly, when expressing a belief in the 
existence of this preclusive power, Barron and Lederman rely on other clauses in Article II and cases 
interpreting them. Id. at 1102 n.651. This reinforces the claim that, even assuming a preclusive core of power 
might exist in some executive powers outlined in Article II, this does not necessarily implicate the same of the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause. That Barron and Lederman could point to no judicial decision which rested upon 
a preclusive core of the Commander-in-Chief power is most telling and unsurprising given Congress’s broad 
express and implied constitutional powers to raise, govern, and regulate the military. See Chappell v. Wallace, 
462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (“It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have 
plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, 
including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline.”). 
316. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (stating that President as Commander in 
Chief “is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, 
and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy”); 
LIEBER, supra note 84, at 18 (concluding Congress may not direct troop movements). 
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historically, or as a matter of precedent, properly analyzed and interpreted. Once the 
concept of military necessity and the nature of command authority are properly 
conceived, one readily recognizes that such references relate only to the President’s 
authority to direct the precise employment of armed forces against an enemy, not to a 
plenary power to dictate either the objects of war or the means or methods those forces 
will use. 
A general example is helpful here. When conducting military campaigns, the 
President and his subordinate commanders must evaluate the strategic and tactical 
disposition of enemy military power to determine how, when, and where to degrade or 
destroy it in order to achieve the nation’s desired strategic ends.317 They then determine 
the amount, types, methods, and means of military power that will be brought to 
bear.318 After the inception of the war with Japan, for example, the President and his 
military leaders determined how, when, and where to engage Japanese forces by air, 
land, and sea. Their decisions included not only broad military objectives, such as 
neutralizing the Japanese naval fleet,319 but specific actions, by specific ships, using 
specific tactics at particular times and places.320 Each subordinate commander then 
implemented these decisions within the limits established by their superiors and 
according to the actual facts and circumstances presented. There is undoubtedly 
substantial discretion involved in these decisions. The cases reviewed above make 
clear, however, that this discretion is not absolute and is subject to applicable limits of 
a superior authority. 
Far from articulating a “preclusive core” of Commander-in-Chief power, 
statements regarding the “conduct of campaigns” and the like are but unfortunate 
attempts to articulate an absence of congressional power. Congress simply possesses no 
express or implied power to command the military—more specifically, Congress 
possesses no power to direct the precise employment of military forces against an 
enemy. Once such terms are used, however, they appeal to the primordial lawyerly 
need to explore or advocate the full implications of the language chosen.321 It is 
 
317. See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS (2008); JACK D. KEM, 
CAMPAIGN PLANNING: TOOLS OF THE TRADE (3d ed. 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, 
OPERATIONS, ch. 6 (2008). This Article will not address the issue of which branch(es) defines the strategic 
political ends because that entails a broader discussion of the Declare War Clause and whether presidential 
foreign affairs powers include the power to initiate foreign hostilities. 
318. See KEM, supra note 317, at 15–24 (discussing how President and his commanders determine 
availability and usage of military power). 
319. See DAN VAN DER VAT, THE PACIFIC CAMPAIGN: THE U.S.-JAPANESE NAVAL WAR 1941–45, at 140-
–41 (1991) (describing immediate military reaction to bombing of Pearl Harbor). 
320. See id. at 170–98 (providing examples of such actions). 
321. Professors Barron and Lederman state the problem more generally by recognizing that: 
Given the inherent indefiniteness of the proposition that the President has preclusive power over the 
conduct of campaigns, an apparent judicial endorsement of that proposition is bound to invite 
executive branch assertions that are both more expansive than the courts intended to countenance 
and unlikely ever to be subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Barron & Lederman II, supra note 15, at 1107. Indeed, this is exactly what former Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) head Jack Goldsmith observed. GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 37 (noting that “all OLC lawyers and 
Attorneys General over many decades” for Presidents of both parties are “driven by the outlook and exigencies 
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therefore not surprising that in expressing the absence of Congress’s powers over war 
and the military, the attempt at a positive description ultimately leads to the impression 
that the description used portrays something autonomous, which then accrues its own 
content and meaning. 
The nature of the problem is similar to the earlier-discussed logical fallacy of 
Justice Jackson’s third tier. By describing the relative powers of the elected branches as 
the president’s “powers minus any powers of Congress,”322 Jackson implied that a 
preclusive core of presidential power might exist. Its existence, however, is implied by 
the analytical model itself rather than the nature of the relevant executive and 
congressional powers at issue. The tenacity with which Professors Barron and 
Lederman adhere to and defend the core/periphery approach to presidential powers323 
in this context demonstrates the difficulty of dispensing with such notions once they 
have formed and taken root. 
Jackson’s model could also simply refer to an incomplete overlap of powers. This 
is what exists in the shared powers over the nation’s military and the conduct of war. 
Because the nature of the Commander-in-Chief power is one of implied powers that are 
both derived from and subject to applicable law, it is more appropriate to analyze the 
scope of Congress’s express and implied powers over war and the armed forces. 
Congress has the power “to make Rules for the Government and Regulation” of the 
military324 and other legislative powers over war. As the Supreme Court found, when 
denying a Bivens remedy325 to members of the armed forces, “[i]t is clear that the 
Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, 
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including 
regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline.”326 In other words, 
Congress can regulate military conduct to preserve good order and discipline. And this 
remains true even in war. 
An attempt by Congress to affirmatively direct the disposition of armed forces at 
war would not be a “rule” for their government or regulation. It would be a specific 
directive, applicable at a specific time or place, and therefore beyond Congress’s 
express and implied powers.327 Coincidentally, it would also be an unconstitutional 
usurpation of the Commander-in-Chief’s command authority. Nonetheless, Congress 
may, pursuant to its enumerated war powers, establish general rules cabining the 
Commander-in-Chief’s strategic or tactical discretion. Such rules might even result in 
an excessively narrow scope of authority for the President, as was arguably the case in 
Little v. Barreme.328 
 
of the presidency to assert more robust presidential powers, especially during a war or crisis, than ha[s] been 
officially approved by the Supreme Court or than is generally accepted in the legal academy or by Congress”). 
322. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
323. See supra note 226 for Barron and Lederman’s commentary on preclusive power. 
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (emphasis added). 
325. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (permitting civil remedy against government officials for certain constitutional violations). 
326. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983). 
327. See RAMSEY, supra note 42, at 254–55 (concluding that it is likely congressional regulations “must 
be generalized standards of conduct, not tactical directions addressed to specific command situations”). 
328. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804). 
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While Congress cannot direct the President to attack a specific enemy position at 
a certain time, from the north or south, by land or air, with tanks or riflemen, or by 
frontal assault, flank attack, or envelopment, it can regulate how the armed forces must 
treat a captured enemy and place other general limits on command discretion in matters 
of war and military discipline. The checks on Congress’s regulatory powers are 
primarily practical and political, with the Constitution establishing their outer legal 
limits. 
What has changed since the Civil War is not the nature of the Commander-in-
Chief power, but rather the nature and variety of threats to our national security in a 
world increasingly interconnected by technology and interdependent on dwindling 
resources.329 These new and emerging threats certainly increase the actual scope of 
issues and events that might affect our national security and increase the perceived 
necessity of a powerful executive able to efficiently respond to them.330 The 
Commander-in-Chief Clause provides a politically and legally convenient point from 
which to base such claims. It also avoids the need to discuss whether other emergency 
executive powers exist, and if so, under what circumstances they might be exercised.331 
V. EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY POWERS—THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Whether the President independently possesses extraordinary emergency or 
protective powers, and if so under what circumstances they may be exercised, is not 
clear. Chase’s suggestion in Milligan that the President could convene military 
 
329. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 4–5 (2008) (“Globalization and growing 
economic interdependence . . . create a web of interrelated vulnerabilities and spread risks even further, 
increasing sensitivity to crises and shocks around the globe and generating more uncertainty regarding their 
speed and effect.”). 
330. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMUELE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN 
REPUBLIC (2010) (arguing that Madisonian separation of powers framework is obsolete and that modern 
constraints on executive are political, not legal). Other commentary touts the functional advantages of the 
presidency, particularly in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdam v. Rumsfeld: The 
Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 179 (2006) 
(arguing superior competencies of executive branch warrant judicial deference in foreign affairs matters); 
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort 
Statute, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 154 (arguing executive branch has superior institutional capacity vis-à-vis the 
courts to achieve purposes underlying Alien Tort Statute). 
331. Professor Goldsmith recounts a story from his time at the Justice Department where he proposed to 
senior Administration lawyers that the President could act “extralegally” and “throw himself on the justice of 
his country.” GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 80–81 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). He claims 
that the Administration was “not remotely interested in this view.” Id. at 81. The Administration lawyers 
believed their actions were lawful, and even if they didn’t, they could not confess error publicly . . . 
because doing so would tip off the enemy . . . . It [also] wasn’t feasible . . . . The post-Watergate 
hyper-legalization of warfare, and the attendant proliferation of criminal investigators, had become 
so ingrained and threatening that the very idea of acting extralegally was simply off the table, even 
in times of crisis. The President had to do what he had to do to protect the country. And the lawyers 
had to find some way to make what he did legal. 
Id. (emphasis added). Goldsmith’s claim that Watergate led to an alleged “hyper-legalization of warfare” is, 
for me, overblown. Watergate was only one of many abuses of executive power that forced congressional 
regulation to prevent further abuses. 
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tribunals to try United States citizen civilians in cases of “controlling necessity,” 
coupled with his suggestion that Congress could indemnify erroneous assertions of 
such authority,332 indicates a belief that the President as well as Congress can ignore 
requirements of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments under certain exigent 
or compelling circumstances.333 The Milligan majority would have also allowed for 
such military jurisdiction if non-military courts were closed. Thus, there was agreement 
that some portion of the Constitution and laws of the United States are subject to what 
might be called situational strict scrutiny. So long as a compelling public interest exists 
and the means chosen are narrowly tailored to achieving that interest, the government’s 
actions are constitutionally permissible, or at the very least excusable by Congress. 
This section explores this theory and its implications for the rule of law. 
A. Emergency Powers—Law or Politics? 
Justice Chase’s endorsement of presidential emergency power which either 
“justifies what it compels” or which “at least insures acts of indemnity from the justice 
of the legislature” suggests an assertion of political power rather than legal authority.334 
In other words, Chase implied that in cases of true necessity, Congress will reliably 
ratify or indemnify the acts of the executive.335 He did not imply that those acts are 
“legal” in the first instance or that they are subject to any specific legal constraints. 
Under the theory as articulated, it appears that the primary authority responsible for 
conducting post hoc scrutiny is Congress, not the courts. The standard therefore 
appears to be political, not legal. The courts apparently apply whatever “rule” Congress 
creates or adopts through its action in response to the actions of the executive branch. 
It is impossible to define in advance the boundaries of such a power, assuming it 
exists.336 One cannot predict with certainty the circumstances under which Congress 
might ratify or indemnify executive acts. Professor Monaghan expressed the belief that 
a requirement for congressional ratification “seems to provide the least intrusive 
presidential authority needed to cope with the emergency.”337 He further asserts that 
“[t]his requirement would seem to induce caution in the executive, while not being so 
onerous as to deter the President from acting when necessity warrants.”338 
A requirement for post hoc ratification is only effective, however, if it is truly a 
requirement. It would at least require an opportunity to obtain third-party review of 
executive actions taken in the face of an alleged emergency to determine if the law was 
 
332. See supra note 229–30 and accompanying text. 
333. See Vladeck, supra note 5. For an interesting historical analysis of “military necessity” supporting 
jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces, see Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and 
Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 
BYU L. REV. 367. 
334. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 140 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring). 
335. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 38 (“If we assume that the President can act in an emergency, our 
constitutional theory would suggest that subsequent congressional approval is necessary.”). 
336. As Professor Monaghan notes, “judicial recognition of a general, inherent presidential ‘emergency’ 
power would result in authority both indefinite in description and uncontainable in practice; the result would 
threaten separation-of-power and civil liberties values.” Id. at 35. 
337. Id. at 38. 
338. Id. 
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properly disregarded. Political and legal realities have been different. After examining 
executive practice in a myriad of national security and foreign affairs matters in the 
post-Vietnam era, Harold Koh concluded: 
 The broader lesson that emerges from this study of executive initiative, 
congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance . . . is that under virtually 
every scenario the president wins. If the executive branch possesses statutory 
or constitutional authority to act and Congress acquiesces, the president 
wins. If Congress does not acquiesce in the president’s act, but lacks the 
political will either to cut off appropriations or to pass an objecting statute 
and override a veto, the president again wins. If a member of Congress or a 
private individual sues to challenge the president’s action, the judiciary will 
likely refuse to hear that challenge on the ground that the plaintiff lacks 
standing; the defendant is immune; the question is political, not ripe, or 
moot; or that relief is inappropriate.339 
In order to sustain a ratification or indemnification approach, Congress must act, or a 
court must have jurisdiction to undertake a public necessity analysis, or both. Although 
one cannot interpret congressional inaction to mean legal acquiescence, it is at least 
temporary political acquiescence.340 At what point should the courts presume to 
intervene in those seemingly rare cases that are both within their jurisdiction and 
susceptible of judicial resolution? 
When the courts find the capacity to engage such questions, congressional 
acquiescence clearly matters. The problem has always been how to interpret 
congressional inaction or “silence.” In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer341 and 
Dames & Moore v. Regan,342 some Justices interpreted congressional inaction after 
notice from the executive coupled with relevant (in their view) legislation as implicit 
congressional approval.343 Others construed such congressional silence and related 
legislation as implicit disapproval.344 Without clear and affirmative congressional 
 
339. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 148 (1990). 
340. Cf. Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 714 (“[L]egislative inaction, whether or not motivated 
by a congressional desire to avoid taking responsibility in the midst of a conflict, may actually entrench a 
baseline of robust statutory regulation already in place, and thereby increase the likelihood that Category 
Three issues might arise.”). 
341. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
342. 453 U.S. 654 (1981) 
343. See Dames, 453 U.S. at 686 (“In light of . . . the inferences to be drawn from the character of the 
legislation Congress has enacted in the area . . . and from the history of acquiescence in executive claims 
settlement—we conclude that the President was authorized to suspend pending claims . . . .”); Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 702 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting the lack of congressional response to the President’s notice 
of seizure and that “Congress has in no wise indicated that its legislation is not to be executed by the taking of 
private property . . . if its legislation cannot otherwise be executed”). 
344. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (“Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor 
disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior 
to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes.”); id. at 601 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ( “In adopting the provisions which it did, by the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947, . . . Congress was very familiar with Governmental seizure as a protective measure. On a balance 
of considerations, Congress chose not to lodge this power in the President.”); id. at 639 (Jackson, J., 
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action, therefore, what may be implied from the available evidence, as well as the 
evidence deemed relevant to the analysis, appears to be rather subjective. 
The purpose of this discussion is not to suggest the ultimate subordination of law 
to politics in real or contrived emergencies. It is to recognize occasions where a true 
necessity does not admit of a specific, predefined legal standard. Congress cannot 
possibly “anticipate and legislate” for “every possible” exception to a statute,345 just as 
tort law does not attempt to prescribe or predefine every instance of allowable public or 
private necessity. Given the freedom of discretion such necessity claims provide, there 
is an obvious temptation to assert their existence whenever it is politically convenient. 
The challenge is whether we can recognize the existence of such a concept without 
inevitably reducing all law to merely a factor that executive branch officials consider in 
their political calculus.346 
B. Notions of “Governmental Necessity” 
The idea that a threat to the nation’s existence might justify violating the law has 
deep historical roots. In 1810, Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend that “[a] strict 
observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high virtues of a good citizen, but 
it is not the highest.”347 He expressed the belief that “[t]he laws of necessity, of self-
preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.”348 
Jefferson further added that “[t]o lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written 
law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are 
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.”349 Jefferson’s 
caution on the exercise of such power is that the “officer is bound to draw [the line for 
such actions] at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his country and the 
rectitude of his motives.”350 
 
concurring) (“Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three 
statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure.”). 
345. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (“Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every 
possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act.”). 
346. Goldsmith states that former Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, David Addington, once 
expressed the attitude that the Administration would “push and push and push until some larger force makes us 
stop,” which caused Goldsmith to surmise that Addington “viewed power as the absence of constraint.” 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 126. One wonders whether the Constitution or its Take Care Clause ever entered 
Addington’s “larger force” equation. It is possible President Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was 
correct when he remarked during the Cuban Missile Crisis that “the law simply does not deal with . . . 
questions of ultimate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty.” Hon. Dean Acheson, 
Panel: Cuban Quarantine: Implications for the Future, Remark Before the Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law (Apr. 25, 
1963), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT ITS FIFTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL 
MEETING 13, 14 (1963). If so, then it is our continuing attempts to apply law in theory where it does not apply 
in fact that creates a cognitive dissonance incurable by any coherent legal theory. 
347. GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 80 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 
20, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
348. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
349. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
350. Id. at 81 (citing 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 347, at 422) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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The Supreme Court has only once indirectly addressed this idea. In the Prize 
Cases,351 the Court gave an alternate rationale for its decision upholding the capture 
and condemnation of “enemy” property as prize of war. It posited that: “If it were 
necessary to the technical existence of a war, that it should have a legislative sanction, 
we find it in almost every act passed at the extraordinary session of the Legislature of 
1861 . . . .”352 It further noted that Congress, “in anticipation of such astute objections, 
pass[ed] an act ‘approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, proclamations, and 
orders of the President, &c., as if they had been issued and done under the previous 
express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.’”353 “Without 
admitting that such an act was necessary under the circumstances,” the Court 
continued, “it is plain that if the President had in any manner assumed powers which it 
was necessary should have the authority or sanction of Congress, that, on the well 
known principle of law, ‘omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato equiparatur,’ this 
ratification has operated to perfectly cure the defect.”354 Citing a similar statement in 
Justice Story’s dissenting opinion in Brown v. United States, the Court asserted “the 
doctrine stated by him on this point is correct and fully substantiated by authority.”355 
Armed conflict obviously provides a ready venue for claims of exceptional 
necessity. It was in the context of the Civil War that Lincoln questioned 
[a]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to 
pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official 
oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was 
believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?356 
Lincoln’s statement begs the question of who in our government may 
constitutionally determine which law(s) must be violated in order to save the nation, 
and at what point we can be sure that their violation is necessary. In the post-9/11 
conflict, “saving American lives” was repeatedly asserted as the ultimate justification 
for a host of actions, some in reasonably apparent violation of applicable domestic and 
international law. It is a powerful political message, especially when any one of its 
recipients might believe that the life being saved could be theirs or a loved one’s. More 
recently, it has been suggested that the President’s alleged “paramount duty to ward off 
serious threats to the constitutional and economic system” would support unilateral 
presidential action to raise the national debt and avoid government default.357 Neither 
 
351. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
352. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670. 
353. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
354. Id. at 671. 
355. Id. (citing Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814)).  
356. Message from Abraham Lincoln to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 246, 253 (Library of America ed., 1989). 
357. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html. It is not clear whether Professors 
Posner and Vermeule believe this to be a legal power or the most politically savvy approach to the crisis. They 
write: 
Constitutionally, [the President] would be on solid ground. Politically, he can’t lose. The public 
wants a deal, The threat to act unilaterally will only strengthen his bargaining power if Republicans 
don’t want to be frozen out; if they defy him, the public will throw their support to the president. 
Either way, republicans look like obstructionists and will pay a price. 
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threats to American lives nor projected economic turmoil necessarily threaten to bring 
an end to the government or the nation. A “spectacular” attack on a major city might 
destabilize the country and precipitate a series of events leading to its demise. Whether 
any specific attack or event might threaten the country’s very existence depends upon a 
multitude of factors making it difficult to predict. 
It is difficult to discard the notion that the President must act when circumstances 
require action to preserve the nation. However, it is equally apparent that “[t]he plain 
terms of the Oath Clause indicate that the duty [to defend the Constitution] at most 
requires the President to take such measures indispensable to the preservation of the 
constitution, through the preservation of the nation.”358 While this is true enough, it 
suggests that a power implied from the Oath Clause and grossly uncertain in its 
application has the potential to disrupt the entire constitutional framework—to 
completely undermine the rule of law.359 Perhaps this observation should be buttressed 
by rephrasing Justice Black’s opinion in Youngstown: “The President’s power to see 
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a law breaker.”360 
C. The Unclear Line Between Governmental, Public, and Military Necessity 
To any extent that the law may be disregarded to preserve the nation, it is not the 
common situation faced by soldiers or commanders, not even in war. That one terrorist 
might know of a yet-unexecuted plan for a “spectacular” attack or other grave threat 
against the United States does not necessitate the brutal or even harsh interrogation, in 
violation of domestic and international law, of every suspected terrorist or terrorist 
sympathizer thought to potentially know about it.361 It is also not clear whether there 
are any absolute thresholds that are so ineffective and/or morally repugnant that they 
might not be crossed under any circumstances, where an attempt at congressional 
ratification would be ineffective.362 
 
Id. 
358. Barron & Lederman I, supra note 15, at 746 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
359. Without regard for any conflicting constitutional assignment of powers in this area, Posner and 
Vermeule posit: 
A deadlocked Congress has become incapable of acting consistently; it commits to entitlements it 
will not reduce, appropriates funds it does not have, borrows money it cannot repay and then 
imposes a debt ceiling it will not raise. One of these things must give; in reality, that means that the 
conflicting laws will have to be reconciled by the only actor who combines the power to act with a 
willingness to should responsibility – the president. 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 357. 
360. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“[T]he President's power 
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”). 
361. Whatever ambiguity might have existed, whether real or contrived, regarding the appropriate 
treatment of al Qaeda or Taliban detainees under the War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006), or 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, should have been resolved with the passage of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–44. 
362. The United States indicated that this might be the case when it joined the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 4 of the ICCPR 
provides for derogation from its provisions “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation . . . to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” Id. art. 4(1). It then prohibits 
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The necessities of war make it tempting to view every urgent situation or potential 
threat to many lives as one of the highest importance, justifying departure from the law. 
As noted in the World War II cases discussed above, such temptations become more 
acute when the threat is against the homeland by an enemy capable of inflicting great 
harm. Even then, there have been limits to what the Supreme Court will tolerate for 
potential enemy sympathizers.363 Clearly defining and consistently applying these 
limits is the most difficult task. 
The Prize Cases made clear that the President already possesses substantial but 
implied emergency powers in domestic matters.364 These powers necessarily entail a 
measure of discretion in their implementation. Even today, section 332 of Title 10 
provides that 
[w]henever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, 
or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make 
it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service 
such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he 
considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.365 
This statute recognizes that enforcing the law is a political and judicial responsibility, 
not a military matter—at least not in the first instance. When does this condition 
change? Under this statute and the Milligan majority opinion, the merger of public with 
military necessities in domestic emergencies occurs only in response to an actual 
invasion366 or a condition of internal conflict that effectively “closes the courts,” or 
 
derogations from provisions regarding, inter alia: the prohibitions of torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment; and ex post facto laws. Id. art. 4(2) (referencing arts. 6 and 15). 
363. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (upholding exclusion of people of 
Japanese ancestry from certain “military areas” on West Coast due to executive fear of an invasion or 
subversion), with Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 305–07 (1944) (reversing denial of habeas corpus relief to 
Japanese American whose detention was based solely on her ancestry with no showing of being a threat to 
security). See supra Part IV.C.3 for a discussion of these cases. 
364. See supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of presidential 
emergency powers according to the Prize Cases. 
365. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (emphases added). 
366. The other statute at issue in the Prize Cases is currently codified at 10 U.S.C. § 12406. It provides: 
Whenever— 
(1) the United States, or any of the Commonwealths or possessions, is invaded or is in danger of 
invasion by a foreign nation; 
(2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United 
States; or 
(3) the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States; 
the President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State in 
such numbers as he considers necessary to repel the invasion, suppress the rebellion, or execute 
those laws. Orders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the 
case of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the 
District of Columbia. 
10 U.S.C. § 12406. 
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otherwise makes it “impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State 
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”367 
Lincoln had occasion to suggest a line between emergency powers and military 
necessity in armed conflict. In a letter explaining his decision to modify an order by 
one of his commanders, General Fremont, purporting to emancipate slaves in 
Kentucky, he explained that: 
Genl. Fremont’s proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the 
liberation of slaves, is purely political, and not within the range of military 
law, or necessity. If a commanding General finds a necessity to seize the 
farm of a private owner, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he 
has the right to do so, and to so hold it, as long as the necessity lasts; and this 
is within military law, because within military necessity. But to say that the 
farm shall no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever; and this as 
well when the farm is not needed for military purposes as when it is, is 
purely political, without the savor of military law about it. And the same is 
true of slaves. If the General needs them, he can seize them, and use them; 
but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future 
condition. That must be settled according to laws made by law-makers, and 
not by military proclamations. . . . 
 I do not say that Congress might not with propriety pass a law, on the 
point, just such as General Fremont proclaimed. . . . What I object to, is, that 
I as President, shall expressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent 
legislative functions of the government.368 
It would seem Lincoln used the phrase “permanent legislative functions” to 
distinguish between sovereign acts that fix rights permanently and those imperative 
military measures which are situational and indefinite. His formulation certainly 
allowed broad military discretion to temporarily invade private rights. Unfortunately, 
Lincoln’s letter does not fully clarify the scope of rights subject to temporary 
derogation. Nor does it clarify whether or under what circumstances some rights, such 
as the right to life, may be permanently sacrificed to the public good. 
D. The Necessary Limits of Military Necessity 
It is usually possible, if difficult, to broadly distinguish between laws that might 
be abrogated or displaced in armed conflict and those that may not. The suggestion that 
in war certain generally applicable domestic laws may be displaced or superseded, or 
that certain private, statutory, and even some constitutional rights may be abrogated, 
does not support the notion that no law applies or that all law is generally subordinate 
 
367. 10 U.S.C. § 332. One wonders whether this standard creates an implied obligation to preserve the 
operation of the domestic courts, either in purely domestic disturbances or wars, in order to avoid the 
imposition of martial law or the use of military tribunals for civilians in all but the most compelling of 
circumstances. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1946) (briefly recounting influence of 
British and U.S. historical events from seventeenth, eighteenth, and ninetheenth centuries in shaping legal 
limitations on military powers in favor of civilian control). 
368. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle 
of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 220–21 (1998) (third emphasis added) (quoting Letter from 
Abraham Lincoln to Orville H. Browning (Sept. 22, 1861), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, supra 
note 356, at 268–69)) 
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to the necessities of war. As noted by Lieber, Lincoln, and the Supreme Court cases 
analyzed above, even the necessities of war are limited to specific imperative measures 
or subject to the limits of laws specifically applicable to the exigency. In such cases, 
the law governing the exigency, whether domestic or international, has already 
balanced the interests and made the required legal or policy determination.369 
The Court has limited the permissible invasion of generally applicable 
constitutional or private rights to only those that must yield in the face of a clear, extant 
necessity. In Milligan, for example, neither the majority nor concurring opinions 
suggested that Milligan could be summarily executed without trial, tortured, or 
punished by cruel or unusual means had he actually been subject to military 
jurisdiction. Both opinions presumably accepted the potential legality of using military 
tribunals under different, but reasonably narrow, circumstances because such tribunals 
have standards and procedures that adequately reduce the risk of a wholly arbitrary 
deprivation of rights. 
Other cases also supported the very limited nature of emergency powers in war. 
The Mitchell v. Harmony370 and United States v. Russell371 cases discussed earlier 
recognized the power to invade private property rights of loyal nationals subject to the 
constitutional requirement for just compensation.372 In Ex parte Endo,373 the Court 
would not countenance the forced detention of an individual presenting no threat to 
national security. Korematsu v. United States374 and Hirabayashi v. United States375 
probably surpass a blurry outer boundary, but their modern critics do not speak to what 
the Constitution might or should permit if the measures adopted were more narrowly 
tailored to specific security threats then facing the nation.376 
Whatever the precise limits, there is no indication that the Court would leave 
everything to complete executive discretion or allow Congress to arbitrarily sanction 
extreme measures, such as torture or inhuman treatment.377 It would seem that 
governmental necessity and judicial strict scrutiny are related in this context. All permit 
the derogation of rights only so far as justified by a clear, identifiable, and compelling 
 
369. See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN HANDBOOK, supra note 181, at 37–38 (“International humanitarian law in 
armed conflicts is a compromise between military and humanitarian requirements . . . . [M]ilitary necessity 
cannot, therefore, justify departing from the rules of humanitarian law in armed conflicts . . . .”); John C. Dehn, 
Permissible Perfidy? Analysing the Colombian Hostage Rescue, the Capture of Rebel Leaders and the World’s 
Reaction, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 627, 648 (2008) (positing that international humanitarian law “has already 
taken into account the competing interests of life and death attendant to war” and “must be generally 
understood to have balanced those interests . . . thereby ‘exclud[ing] the possibility of invoking’ exceptional 
circumstances excusing its violation”). 
370. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851). 
371. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871). 
372. See supra notes 244–54 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the facts and holdings of 
Mitchell and Russell. 
373. 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944). 
374. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
375. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
376. See supra notes 265–71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Korematsu and Hirabayashi. 
377. See Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380, 381 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605) (“If an act is prohibited 
by the constitution, and it is beyond the power of congress to authorize it, then it may be said the wrong done 
by the act is not subject to complete indemnity by congress . . . .”). 
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public interest.378 Then again, as Koh’s observations suggest, without a viable legal or 
political forum to vindicate those rights, their existence or preservation may depend 
entirely upon executive self-restraint.379 Ironically, this condition was precisely what 
the Colonists sought to remedy by declaring independence, and what the Framers 
sought to avoid by separating national powers over war and the military. 
It is with this background that we can better understand the “elegant simplicity”380 
of Justice Black’s opinion in Youngstown. Justice Black begins his analysis with a 
truism, that the “President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an 
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”381 He then dismisses, on separation of 
powers grounds, any notion that the President had general executive authority to seize 
the nation’s steel mills without congressional authorization.382 As regards the 
Commander-in-Chief power, Black concluded that 
 
378. Professor Monaghan “accept[s] the proposition that the government will act in an emergency when 
the dominant interests so require.” Monaghan, supra note 17, at 33 n.157. For him, “the question is whether in 
legal analysis the national government’s emergency power is extra-constitutional.” Id. The question may not 
be so simple. Ex parte Milligan and the Prize Cases suggest that it is possibly both constitutional and extra-
constitutional, at least in some circumstances. 
According to the majority in Milligan, the President, empowered by the Commander-in-Chief Clause, may 
subject civilians in U.S. territories to military tribunals as a matter of military necessity—in violation of their 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as well as Article III’s vesting of jurisdiction—at least when the courts are 
closed. This analysis would seem to place the power to do so entirely within the Constitution; precisely where, 
however, is not clear. Perhaps it is implicit within Congress’s power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia 
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Quirin make clear the importance of at least implied legislative sanction to the 
deprivation of private rights, which should, of course, originate in an enumerated power. 
In the Prize Cases, the President’s commander-in-chief powers, activated by delegated congressional 
authority, permitted use of the international laws of war to deprive citizens of Confederate States of their 
property (whether loyal to the Union or disloyal we are unsure because the court’s analysis made the question 
irrelevant) by declaring them to be the equivalent of an enemy. This action then appears to be both 
constitutional and extra-constitutional—unless one accepts that the international laws of war are somehow 
impliedly adopted in domestic law during war, as is at least suggested by some commentary. See, e.g., 1 
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, supra note 68, at 1 (noting that “the law of war in this country . . . is quite 
independent of the ordinary law,” with “its original authority in the war powers of Congress and the Executive, 
and thus constitutional in its source” (emphasis added)). At bottom, any emergency power is of constitutional 
origin by virtue of its reflecting the sovereign will. Its form and limits, however, have been determined to be 
extra-constitutional in some circumstances. The separated nature of our sovereign power leads to an occasional 
schizophrenia that courts of appropriate jurisdiction must resolve when cases arise. 
379. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. One commentator has noted that many legal issues 
addressed in opinions by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which provides legal advice to the President and 
other executive components, “are unlikely ever to come before a court in justiciable form” and “often represent 
the final word in those areas.” Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1448, 1451 (2010). Morrison also notes that the OLC “is not immune to various external pressures” 
although it may employ “procedural devices to deflect . . . those pressures.” Id. at 1470. Such devices, 
however, “cannot guarantee OLC’s own commitment to integrity, independence, and excellence in its work.” 
Id. 
380. GLENNON, supra note 43, at 10. After this description, Glennon claims that Black’s opinion “has 
not withstood the test of time.” Id. It was, however, cited approvingly in Medellin v. Texas. 552 U.S. 491, 524 
(2008) (citing Youngstown for the proposition that “[t]he President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of 
any governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself’”). 
381. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
382. Id. at 587–89. 
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[t]he order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s 
military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The 
Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad 
powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater 
of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though “theater of war” 
be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional 
system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the 
ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to 
keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation’s 
lawmakers, not for its military authorities.383 
Black recognized the broad discretion attending military necessity in a theater of war. 
While he dismissed the notion that the President may burden private rights 
domestically during a purely foreign war, he did not foreclose the notion that a 
commander in a theater of war, including an actual domestic battlefield should one ever 
again exist, possesses the power to do so. In Youngstown, there was simply no viable 
claim to a domestic military threat or overriding public necessity.384 
The complicating factor is that Congress is not necessarily limited to 
extraordinary circumstances in determining which executive acts it will ratify or 
indemnify. Congress might have ratified Truman’s decision to seize the steel mills. 
While this would have created potential Compensation Clause or other constitutional 
issues, Congress’s determination of the necessity of such action might have been 
sanctioned given its enumerated powers to regulate commerce and to raise and provide 
for the army and navy. As earlier mentioned, Chase’s Milligan formulation did not 
limit cases of “controlling necessity” to those which pose a threat to the existence of 
the nation. Indeed, the Mitchell Court suggested that Congress might have indemnified 
the military commander who unjustifiably destroyed the merchant’s property in 
Mexico.385 Also mentioned earlier, Congress appears to have effectively excused, for 
purposes of domestic trial at least, the actions of at least some interrogators in the post-
9/11 conflict.386 Presumably, the courts may review the constitutionality of any 
ratification or indemnification that permits the abrogation of private or constitutional 
rights387 provided there is an opportunity for them to do so.388 
 
383. Id. at 587. 
384. As Professor Monaghan notes, “despite the government's argument and President Truman’s 
statement, no emergency existed. Ample time existed for congressional action, both before and after the 
seizure, yet Congress did nothing. To transform political deadlock into an emergency would drain the concept 
of emergency of all content.” Monaghan, supra note 17, at 37–38 (citations omitted). 
385. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 135 (1851). 
386. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. 
387. See Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 381, 381 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605) (discussing whether 
congressional ratification could cure constitutional error of trial “illegal at the time for want of an act of 
Congress”). 
388. In general, the Federal Tort Claims and Westfall Acts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006), appear to 
effectively indemnify a great deal of government conduct. They first convert a civil suit to one against the 
government when employees act within the scope of their employment and when there is no relevant statutory 
or constitutional right of action. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b). The Acts then limit the rights of action that might be 
pursued by divesting the courts of jurisdiction, particularly in military matters, over claims involving 
“combatant activities” of the armed forces as well as claims arising in a foreign country. 28 U.S.C. § 2780(j), 
(k); see, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700–12 (2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s FTCA-based 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has consistently observed both express and implied 
limitations on the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief. It has done so in 
international and non-international, as well as general and limited, armed conflicts. 
Moreover, the Court’s precedent fully supports the proposition that laws plainly 
calculated to cabin executive discretion in armed conflict are not subject to derogation 
by the Commander-in-Chief on claims of general military authority or necessity. 
Instead, precedent reveals that the Commander-in-Chief’s military powers extend only 
to measures not prohibited by specifically applicable domestic and international law 
and reasonably calculated to defeat a national enemy.389 
Precedent also indicates that the status of an individual as an enemy of the United 
States is relevant to the determination of the applicable law, and thus, the level or 
nature of the necessity required to support presidential action. While a simple, 
McCulloch v. Maryland390 concept of military necessity might justify acts against 
public enemies regardless of nationality, precedent endorses an idea of imperative 
public necessity: the power to invade private, statutory, and constitutional rights of 
even loyal U.S. nationals when strictly necessary under the circumstances, but only to 
the extent justified by those circumstances. 
Whatever authority exists to act in violation of a specifically applicable law in 
response to an existential national threat must be defined quite narrowly. As the result 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld391 makes clear, implied powers of military necessity already 
supersede laws not clearly intended to apply to armed conflict, such as general criminal 
laws prohibiting executive detention without congressional authority, or the “assault” 
or “murder” of an enemy as part of lawful hostilities.392 Thus, any claim of exclusive 
presidential power to violate laws intended to regulate armed conflict can apply only to 
 
complaints under the foreign country exception). In the post-9/11 conflicts, the potential for this result was 
demonstrated in In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007). In that 
case, the court dismissed a suit by detainees seeking damages for torture and inhuman treatment under 
international law and the Alien Tort Statute. Id. at 88–91. Even assuming the allegations were true, the court 
found that the putative defendants were acting within the scope of their employment, as broadly defined by the 
court. Id. at 114. The court therefore dismissed the case for failure to meet the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) requirement for an express statutory right of action. Id. at 115. But see Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:08-
CV-1902, 2011 WL 3319439, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2011) (denying and granting in part motion to dismiss 
Bivens constitutional tort and other claims on basis of qualified immunity and other grounds); Padilla v. Yoo, 
633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same). 
389. One must recall, however, that the opinions in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 
(1814), Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) support 
the notion that through congressional authorization or a “controlling executive act,” the United States 
possesses the sovereign “power (not the right) to violate its treaty obligations” and other international law. 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 196, 244 (2d ed. 1996). 
390. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See supra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
McCulloch. 
391. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
392. To remove any doubt, the UCMJ provides a “justification” defense at courts-martial for a “death, 
injury, or other act caused or done in the proper performance of a legal duty.” Rules for Courts-Martial 916(c), 
in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2008 ed,) at II-109. The commentary to this defense 
provides that “killing an enemy combatant in battle is justified.” Id. 
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the most exceptional of circumstances, and must be limited in time and scope to a truly 
extraordinary necessity.393 Although Congress cannot provide for every contingency, 
Congress has delegated broad presidential discretion to respond to an extensive range 
of crises. There is no reason to believe that the political branches cannot devise a 
system of laws responsive to the threats of the modern world, including international 
terrorism. 
What we witnessed in the early phases of the post-9/11 armed conflict was an 
attempt by executive branch lawyers to make the scope of military necessity co-
extensive with that which this Article terms governmental necessity.394 Perhaps this is 
due to the fact that the Court has not been careful to distinguish, or entirely consistent 
in its application of, the implied powers of military and public necessity in war. 
Perhaps it also is due to the extraordinary nature of the threat posed by international 
terrorists, as well as the lack of reliable information regarding when, where, or how 
those threats might again manifest.395 One hopes it is not because the motives of the 
Bush Administration were not as pure as Jefferson suggested they must be to justify the 
use of extraordinary emergency powers.396 
 
393. See Barron & Lederman II, supra note 15, at 975–76 (discussing “particular claim of limited 
necessity” that Thomas Jefferson asserted in connection with exercise of presidential power not granted by 
statute or Constitution). 
394. Here are two of several examples. In a memorandum opinion signed by Professor Yoo citing 
excerpts from Supreme Court opinions, prior OLC opinions, and statements of prior Presidents, the OLC 
concluded that it is 
beyond question that the President has the plenary constitutional power to take such military actions 
as he deems necessary and appropriate to respond to the terrorist attacks upon the United States on 
September 11, 2001. Force can be used both to retaliate for those attacks, and to prevent and deter 
future assaults on the Nation. Military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or 
states that participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the Constitution 
vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups or organizations that cannot be 
demonstrably linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the 
security of the United States and the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas. 
Yoo Memo, supra note 33, at 24 (emphases added). This opinion is notable for its dearth of 
analysis—or for that matter disclosure—of contrary authority. 
Similarly, Judge Bybee, then an Assistant Attorney General in the OLC, signed a memorandum containing 
these now-infamous words regarding the President’s power to authorize what have been called “enhanced 
interrogation techniques”: 
Congress can no more interfere with the President’s conduct of the interrogation of enemy 
combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield. Just as statutes that 
order the President to conduct warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be 
unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he 
believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States. 
Bybee Memo, supra note 34, at 207. 
395. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 22, at 71–76 (discussing President’s “threat matrix” and “anxiety” 
created in executive branch by knowledge of potential threat and lack of specific information regarding its 
possible manifestations). 
396. Compare supra note 350 and accompanying text for a discussion of the President’s ability to extend 
his conduct beyond the bounds of legality, with Goldsmith’s explanation, supra note 316, of why extralegal 
conduct “wasn’t feasible.” The latter sounds more like a lack of true conviction or political courage, which 
then required contrived legal analysis as cover. 
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Whatever the reason or reasons, it is essential to thoroughly understand and 
carefully apply the “necessities of war” that define the Commander-in-Chief power. As 
Hamilton cautioned, “[i]t is of the nature of war to increase the executive, at the 
expense of the legislative authority.”397 The Framers clearly understood this and 
provided against it by subordinating executive authority to the legislature in matters of 
war and general military government and regulation. 
To prevent overly expansive (or even overly modest) claims of Commander-in-
Chief power, we must heed Madison’s warning: 
A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of 
proper powers, or from the usurpation of powers requisite for the public 
safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary 
point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the 
contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the 
assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective 
constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional 
authorities.398 
Our government can only prevent executive usurpation of our national war powers by 
observing and enforcing the implied and subordinate nature of the Commander-in-
Chief power. Only then will the federal government’s powers to defend the nation be 
once again shared—permitting each branch of government to assume its role in 
protecting and preserving our Republic. 
 
 
 
397. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 41, at 92 (Alexander Hamilton). 
398. THE FEDERALIST NO. 20, supra note 41, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison). 
